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Summary
This thesis seeks to evaluate MacIntyre's claim that recourse to the tradition
of virtue ethics in the Aristotelian-Thomist sense is the only viable intellectual
option, given the alleged demise of the so-called"Enlightenment Project".
It raises a twofold question: First, is it coherent to argue that MacIntyre's re-
appropriation of an ancient moral tradition is possible? Does such a claim
duly reckon with the conditions under which meaningful forms are
understood? The first claim being defended is that MacIntyre does not
sufficiently respect Gadamer's conditions under which understanding occurs.
It is also argued that MacIntyre does not provide coherent conditions for
rationally choosing between traditions in order to possibly vindicate them. As
such, MacIntyre's re-appropriating of the Aristotelian tradition in moral theory
is not coherent and convincing.
Secondly, does the dichotomy of "Nietzsche versus Aristotle" represent the
only viable alternatives for us in our efforts to continue the enterprise of
moral theorising? The second claim being defended is that the dichotomy is
not a coherent way of moral theorising. The third claim being defended is
that Gadamer represents a viable alternative to the ultimatum in that his
thought provides the possibility of a more coherent way of moral theorising
than MacIntyre's.
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Opsomming
Hierdie tesis stel ten doel die evaluasie van MacIntyre se standpunt dat die
deugde-etiek van die Aristoteliaanse-Thomistiestradisie die enigste blywende
opsie is, aangesiendie sogenaamde"Verligtingsprojek" misluk het.
Die tesis stel twee kernvrae aan die orde: Eerstens, is dit sinvol om te
argumenteer dat MacIntyre se appropriasie van bogenoemde etiese tradisie
moontlik is? Verleen so n aanspraak genoegsamewaarde aan die kondisies
waaronder sindraers verstaan word? Die eerste standpunt wat verdedig
word, is dat MacIntyre nie genoeg ag slaan op Gadamer se opvatting oor die
kondisies vir verstaan nie. Daar word verder ook geargumenteer dat
MacIntyre nie koherente kondisies aandui vir 'n keuse tussen tradisies nie en
as sodanig ondermyn dit die koherensie van sy werk. MacIntyre se
appropriasie van die Aristoteliaanse tradisie in morele teorie is dus nie
koherent of oortuigend nie.
Tweedens, is die dichotomie van "Nietzsche of Aristoteles" die enigste
moontlike alternatief vir die voortgaande studie van morele teorie? Die
tweede aanspraak wat verdedig word, is dat die dichotomie nie 'n koherente
wyse van morele argumentasie is nie. Die derde aanspraak wat verdedig word
is dat Gadamer 'n werkbare alternatief verskaf vir die dichotomie. Sy denke
voorsien 'n meer koherente wyse om met morele teorie om te gaan as die
een wat MacIntyre verskaf.
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1Introduction
In the New York Times Book Review, Alasdair MacIntyre is referred to as
being "the past, present, future and all-time philosophical historians' historian
of philosophy" (TRVME:back cover). MacIntyre can rightfully be acclaimed as
one of the foremost moral theorists of the latter part of the zo" century, and
his now famous trilogy (After virtue; Whosejustice, which rationality? and
Three rival versions of moral enquiry) are, according to what now seems to
be the case, destined to become a classic of 20th century philosophy.
MacIntyre's thought is one of the most powerful re-evaluations of the
importance and force of tradition in moral philosophy. In this sense, he adds
his voice to the choir of critiques of modernity and the enlightenment in the
course of the previous century, although his particular brand of critique has a
focus that is different from most others. As such he turns out to be a
powerful voice in the larger debate between liberals and communitarians in
political and moral philosophy.
As a critic of the Enlightenment, MacIntyre has much in common with
Gadamer. Not only are both thinkers highly critical of the Enlightenment, but
they also make it one of their main challenges to restore intellectual credibility
to the concept of tradition. Both are intensely concerned and involved with a
re-appreciation of the pivotal insights of Aristotelian ethics. However, the
differences between them are almost more intriguing than the similarities,
and a great part of this thesis will be an effort to show how remarkably
differently they go about arguing for the restoration of the virtue tradition in
ethics, and how fundamentally their methodologies differ. Whereas MacIntyre
wishes to restore the Aristotelian tradition by (allegedly) simply dismissing the
Enlightenment, Gadamer understands the conditions under which traditions
are interpreted and revitalized much better in my opinion. This will be argued
in much more detail later on.
1
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
MacIntyre's philosophicalwork is marked early on in his career by expressing
passionatecommitment for Marxismand Christianity. It is indeed MacIntyre's
passion for that which he holds dear and the scope of those dearly held
beliefs that makes him stand out as a philosopher. In Ernest Gellner'swords,
"what distinguishes professor MacIntyre is not the number of beliefs he has
doubted, but the number of beliefs he has embraced. His capacity for doubt
we share or surpass; it is his capacity for faith which is distinctive and
perhaps unrivalled" (Gellner, 1974: 193).
MacIntyre's first major work on ethics, A Short History of Ethics, was
published in 1967. Here MacIntyre methodically starts his quest of taking
modernity and its reluctance to view moral concepts in historical context to
task. With his 1971 Against the Self-Images of the Age, MacIntyre similarly
takes Marxism and Christianity to task for failing to be "able to provide the
light that our social and individual lives need" (AV: viii). This failing sows the
seedsof MacIntyre's discontent concerning contemporary moral theory.
With the publishing of After Virtue in 1981, this discontent quite suddenly
turns to 'rage against modern morality and the "Enlightenment Project" in
general'. Here MacIntyre's work takes on a more critical turn. Horton and
Mendus (1994: 1) make no exaggeration when the say that After Virtue is
characterised by "complete disenchantment". The metamorphosis of
MacIntyre's moral theorising comes to a lucid head with what is rightly
regarded as his magnum opus.
The context in which MacIntyre's ethical theorising arises is the rightful
indignation of logical positivism and the effects that the latter had on moral
theory. In the world of analytical philosophy, the thinker mostly responsible
for the hold that positivism gained on moral theory was AJ. Ayer, and the
book in which he did this was his critique of ethics and theology in his
Language, Truth and Logie, first published in 1936. For Ayer, our knowledge
is of two distinct kinds: that which relates to questions of empirical fact and
2
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that which relates to questions of value (Ayer, 1971: 136). For Ayer, only the
former can be taken seriously:
We shall set ourselves to show that in so far as statements of value are
significant, they are ordinary 'scientific' statements; and that in so far
as they are not scientific, they are not in the literal sense significant,
but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor
false.
(Ayer, 1971: 136)
Ayer maintains the Enlightenment anti-thesis between (scientific) reason and
the emotions. He maintains that since ethical expressions are merely
expressions of emotion, they should not belong to ethical philosophy, for true
philosophy works in the realm of reason. For Ayer, "[a] strictly philosophical
treatise on ethics should therefore make no ethical pronouncements" (Ayer,
1971: 137). He goes on to say that ethical judgements have "no validity"
(145), that it is "impossible to dispute about questions of value" (146), that
"ethical concepts are pseudo-concepts and therefore unanalysable" (148). All
ethical language and claims are therefore of a noncognitive nature. Hence the
rise of "emotivism" as the standard position on the cognitive nature of moral
language at the pinnacle of logical positivism.
This era of scientific reason characteristic of the Enlightenment Project
represents the bugbear against which MacIntyre's moral theorising reacts.
For MacIntyre, Ayer's emotivism is utterly unacceptable, if for no other reason
than that it makes it impossible for ethics and moral theory to produce moral
precepts that can be translated into actual moral practice. Here I fully agree
with MacIntyre. In turning to MacIntyre's philosophical project, we must keep
the background context of this 'disenchantment' with Ayer in mind.
A disquieting hypothesis on contemporary philosophy
3
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MacIntyre's After Virtue opens with him painting a scandalousscene in which
people turn on the natural sciences. Scientists are blamed for a series of
environmental disasters and their research is literally and metaphorically torn
apart. Only fragments of the scientific scheme remain. This fragmentation
makes the overall scientific scheme incoherent. Not only are the natural
sciences in a state of grave disorder, but moreover, no one has the
conceptual tools necessaryto see the disorder for the disaster it is. It is not
simply that people cannot put the puzzle that science has become back
together, but that they do not see the puzzleas such. MacIntyre tells us that
that this scientific disaster is (hypothetically) an analogy for what has
happened in the moral sphere:
The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world
which we inhabit the languageof morality is in the same state of grave
disaster as the language of natural science in the imaginary world
which I described. What we possess, if this view is true, are the
fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those
contexts from which their significance derived. We indeed possess
simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions.
But we have - very largely, if not entirely - lost our comprehension,
both theoretical and practical, of morality.
(AV: 2)
MacIntyre is quick to raise an objection to this proposal. Surely such a world-
altering historical event cannot simply vanish from view? If such a
catastrophe really occurred would it not be on record? To his own questions,
MacIntyre smugly retorts that it has to be that only an elite few will see that
what is really a catastrophe is not seen as such by the 'masses'. The dilemma
with this retort is that MacIntyre seems to have deprived himself, in
expanding his hypothesis, of arguments necessary to sustain it. For if the
proposed catastrophe cannot readily be recognized, how does MacIntyre
4
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know about it? (AV: 3). MacIntyre's point is that for the hypothesis to be
plausible (i.e. 'true') it must appear implausible:
For if the hypothesis is true, it will necessarilyappear implausible, since
one way of stating part of the hypothesis is precisely to assert that we
are in a condition which almost nobody recognisesand which perhaps
nobody at all can recognise fully. If my hypothesis appeared initially
plausible, it would certainly be false.
(AV: 4)
MacIntyre' s hypothesis thus puts him into an antagonistic stance and onto
the back foot. His hypothesis must, if it is true, initially be considered
implausible. It's plausibility or implausibility can only be shown in retrospect.
We must then follow MacIntyre's thesis in order to attain a point from which
we can look at the hypothesis in retrospect.
The nature of moral disagreement today
Considerthe following arguments concerning abortion:
• Everybody has certain rights over his or her own person, including
his or her own body. It follows from the nature of these rights that
at the stage when the embryo is essentially a part of the mother's
body, the mother has a right to make her own uncoerced decision
on whether she will have an abortion or not. Therefore abortion is
morally permissible and ought to be allowed by law.
• I cannot will that my mother should have had an abortion when she
was pregnant with me, except perhaps if it had been certain that
the embryo was dead or gravely damaged. But if I cannot will this
in my own case, how can I consistently deny to others the right to
life that I claim for myself? I would break the so-called Golden Rule
5
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unless I denied that a mother has in general a right to an abortion.
I am of course thereby committed to the view that abortion ought
to be legally prohibited.
• Murder is wrong. Murder is the taking of innocent life. An embryo
is an identifiable individual, differing from a newborn infant only in
being at an earlier stage on the long road to adult capacities and, if
any life is innocent, that of an embryo is. If infanticide is murder,
as it is, abortion is murder. So abortion is not only morally wrong,
but ought to be legally prohibited.
It is striking to note that contemporary moral theorising is characterised by
disagreement. Arguments generally can go on and on without terminus. All
sides to the above debate can give (apparently) good arguments for their
viewpoints, but there seems to be no decisiveway of deciding between them.
In short, according to MacIntyre, "there seems to be no rational way of
securing moral agreement in our culture" (AV: 6).
Indeed, this statement by MacIntyre may seem hardly unusual. Many people
today do proclaim that we cannot solve contemporary moral problems like the
abortion issue because all moral (and evaluative) argument must be
interminable. MacIntyre calls this, the 'challenge of emotivisnf. Emotivists
will say that you have your view on the morality of abortion and that they
have their view and that is simply that. For them, only factual judgements
are true or false. It is only in the realm of fact that there are rational criteria
by means of which people can secure consensus. For them, moral
judgements are neither true nor false and it makes no sense to say that
agreement in moral judgement can be secured by any rational method. (AV:
6-13). According to MacIntyre's definition,
6
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Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgements and more
specifically all moral judgements are nothing but expression of
preference, expressionsof attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral
or evaluative in character
(AV: 11)
Emotivists hold that it is universally the case that morality is a matter of taste.
This belief seems downright incoherent to me. Is this 'fact' that the
emotivists hold onto (i.e. that morality is simply a matter of taste) not also a
matter of taste? Emotivismcannot stand up to the scrutiny of a self-reflexive
argument. According to emotivists, where there are principles in moral
theorising, they are illusory - masks covering up the subjectivism involved in
moral choice. According to MacIntyre (AV: 21), emotivism presents itself
throughout the history of philosophy in a variety of guises. MacIntyre seems
pained by the fact that people today act and speak as if emotivism were true
even if they are not consciously aware of it. Emotivism's persistence is a
bugbear for him and he says that it marks "a degeneration, a grave cultural
loss" (AV: 21).
Where does our culture of emotivism come from? According to MacIntyre, it
is the successor of the failure of the Enlightenment Project of 'justifying
morality'. The Enlightenment Project in general is that of moving from
mythos to logos. It is the project of overcoming superstition and giving
everything - the moral sphere included - a rational basis. Given the failure of
this project - the project of providing a rational vindication for morality - it
was (incorrectly) assumed (consciouslyor not) that morality has an emotivist
basis. MacIntyre's point that the Enlightenment project failed is nothing new
in philosophical discourse. This debate rages on and on. More interesting
and original is his claim that it had to fail
Why the Enlightenment Project of justifying morality had to fail
1 This title is taken from chapter five of After Virtue. The emphasis is mine.
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The historical ancestor of the modern moral scheme is analysed by Aristotle in
the NicomacheanEthics. Aristotle's moral scheme requires three elements:
i. Untutored human nature
ii. .Moral precepts that allow man to pass from his natural state to the
state in-which-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos.
iii. Man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos(AV: 52)
The problem - the 'modern muddle' in moral theory - occurs, according to
MacIntyre, when the idea of a telos is discredited. The joint secular rejection
of theology and the rejection of the Aristotelian notion of a telos 2 means that
suddenly iii. is taken out of the moral scheme. SaysMacIntyre:
Since the whole point of ethics - both as a theoretical and a practical
discipline - is to enable man to pass from his present state to his true
end, the elimination of any notion of essential human nature and with
it the abandonment of any notion of a telos leaves behind a moral
scheme composed of two remaining elements whose relationship
becomesquite unclear (my emphasis).
(AV: 52)
What we are left with since the advent of the modern world is ii. - a set of
injunctions deprived of their teleological context and i. - the notion of man as
he is. What then is one to make of the link between i. and ii.? The link
becomes random and fragmented. What 'Enlightened' philosophers have
tried to do is to find a rational basis in morality from conceptually analysing
'man-as-he-ls' (i.). They "share[d] in the project of constructing valid
arguments which will move from premises concerning human nature as they
2 Aristotle believed, for example, that an acorn fell to the ground because that is where it
belonged. Along came empirical science and the theory of gravity and Aristotle can no longer
be taken seriously.
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understand it to be to conclusions about the authority of moral rules and
precepts" (AV: 50). This task is doomed to failure from the outset. Such
philosophers have inherited incoherent fragments from a once coherent
scheme and tried to put them together again. This task is, according to
MacIntyre, at once "impossible" and "quixotic" (AV: 53) because "[e]ach of
the three elements of the scheme -...- requires reference to the other two if
its status and function are to be intelligible" (AV: 51).
Herein lies the 'modern muddle' concerning contemporary moral theory.
Since the enlightenment, moral theorists have been oblivious to its existence,
with two notable exceptions. Kant, according to MacIntyre, comes second
closest to adequately recognising the modern muddle. In his second Critique,
Kant acknowledges that without a teleological framework, the whole project
of morality becomes unintelligible. This framework is to be presupposed by
pure practical reason. According to MacIntyre, eighteenth century
'Enlightenment' philosophers hold such a framework unconsciously and
unwittingly in a bastardised form:
[I]f my thesis is correct, Kant was right; morality did in the eighteenth
century, as a matter of historical fact, presuppose something very like
the teleological scheme of God, freedom and happiness as the final
crown of virtue which Kant propounds. Detach morality from that
framework and you will no longer have morality; or, at the very least,
you will have radically transformed its character' (my emphasis).
(AV: 53)
According to MacIntyre, Nietzschecomes closest" to recognising the 'modern
muddle' for what it is. Macintyre calls Nietzsche"the moral philosopher" (AV:
108) because of his serious pursuit of the problem of emotivism and
subjectivism in moral theory. Nietzsche is right to see that in modern moral
parlance, people are uttering sentencesof subjective taste under the guise of
3 With the exception of MacIntyre, I suppose.
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principled theorising. His description is spot-on. Where he goes wrong is
that he does not understand the historical circumstances that lead to the
muddle. He does not recognise the cause of the modern muddle" and
moreover, presents frivolous" solutions to it.
What are the consequencesof the 'modern muddle' for moral judgements?
In the classical Aristotelian tradition, one calls something 'good' or 'bad' in
terms of the extent to which it meets its function (telos). A 'good' watch is a
watch that keeps the time well. To call the watch 'good' is to refer to a
factual statement. The factual statement is "this watch keeps the time well".
These factual statements extend to persons and actions. To say that an
action is 'just' or 'right' is to say that it is the function that a 'good' man would
perform in those specific circumstances. SaysMacintyre:
Within this tradition moral and evaluative statements can be called true
or false in precisely the way in which all other factual statements can
so be called. But once the notion of essential human purposes or
functions disappears from morality, it begins to appear implausible to
treat moral judgements as factual statements" (my emphasis).
(AV: 57)
We still speak as if moral judgements are true or false, but it baffles us to
think in virtue of what they are true or false. "That this should be so," says
MacIntyre (AV: 57) "is perfectly intelligible if the historical hypothesis which I
have sketched is true: that moral judgements are linguistic survivals from the
practices of classical theism which have lost the context provided by those
practices."
Another manifestation of the malaise of the 'modern muddle' is the
Enlightenment commitment to the proclamation that no 'ought' conclusion
4 He locates its cause, as always, in 'the will to power'.
S See the next section "Nietzsche or Aristotle? - An ultimatum".
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can be derived from 'is' premises. In the classical tradition this was simply
not a problem. For Aristotle, 'man' stands to 'good man' as 'watch' stands to
'good watch' - one cannot separate man and things from their function and
purpose. "It is only" says MacIntyre (AV: 56), "when a man is thought of as
an individual prior to and apart from all roles that 'man' ceasesto become a
functional concept." In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle takes the starting-
point of ethical enquiry to be that the relationship of man to 'living well' is
analogous to that of a harpist 'playing well' (AV: 56). In contemporary (post-
teleological) moral parlance and idiom we still speak as if the Aristotelian
scheme exists, whilst still clinging to the proclamation that no 'ought'
conclusion can be derived from 'is' premises. According to MacIntyre,
[T]he 'No "ought" conclusion from "is" premises' principle becomes
and inescapable truth for philosophers whose culture possessesonly
the impoverished moral vocabulary which results from the episodes I
have recounted. That it was taken to be a timeless logical truth was a
sign of a deep lack of historical consciousnesswhich then informed and
even now infects too much of moral philosophy. For its initial
proclamation was itself a crucial historical event. It signals both a final
break with the classical tradition and the decisive breakdown of the
eighteenth century project of justifying morality in the context of the
inherited, but already incoherent, fragments left behind from tradition.
(AV: 6)
MacIntyre rues the loss of traditional moral theorising and much of the
context in which it takes place. He notes that what he deems a loss and
degradation, is deemed to be the triumph of the autonomous self by
Enlightenment thinkers (AV: 58). For Enlightenment thinkers, theology and
teleology represent an imprisoning and hierarchical world", The scientific
6 The problem I find with a teleological scheme is that it can all to easily be used to justify a
hierarchical order. In such an order, for example, if your te/os is to be a slave, then you are
supposedly forever stuck in that position. It precludes the possibility of bettering oneself.
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refutation of them both serves to liberate the self from an oppressive world
order. Thus the individual, the distinctively modern self is invented.
After telling us why the Enlightenment Project of justifying morality had to fail
(was doomed to failure), MacIntyre makes perhaps his most controversial
move in After Virtue. He presents us with a stark ultimatum concerning what
we are to make of the 'modern muddle'. The stakes of this ultimatum are so
high that it demandsour immediate undivided attention.
Nietzsche or Aristotle? - An ultimatum
Nietzsche'sgreatnessas a moral philosopher for MacIntyre is twofold. Firstly,
he recognises that appeals to objectivity in the moral sphere are merely
expressions of subjective will and secondly, he understands the nature of the
problems that the former fact poses for moral philosophy. In The Gay
Science, Nietzsche jeers at the Enlightenment Project's agenda to find
objective foundations for morality. Where Nietzsche goes wrong, according
to MacIntyre, is to say that if morality is merely an expression of will then
morality can only be what one's will creates. Nietzscherazes morality to the
ground. In its place there can only be the will to power and the Ubermensch,
that "at once absurd and dangerous fantasy" (AV: 107). It is Nietzsche's
recognition of the state of contemporary moral philosophy that constitutes his
greatness for MacIntyre. MacIntyre seems to agree with Nietzschewhen the
latter says (in MacIntyre's words):
The rational and rationally justified autonomous moral subject of the
eighteenth century is a fiction, an illusion;
He disagrees with what Nietzsche goes on to say following this (again in
MacIntyre's words):
What this argument entails, and this is what I will show MacIntyre forgets (see Bernstein on
MacIntyre in Chapter 4), is commitment to ideals hammered out during the Enlightenment.
12
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so, Nietzsche resolves, let will replace reason and let us make
ourselves into autonomous moral subjects by some gigantic and heroic
act of the will, an act of the will that by its quality may remind us of
that archaic aristocratic self-assertiveness which preceded what
Nietzsche took to be the disaster of slave-morality and by which its
effectiveness may be the prophetic precursor of a new era.
(AV: 107)
The preceding paragraph shows Nietzsche's'bad side' according to MacIntyre,
For it is in his relentlessly serious pursuit of the problem, not in his
frivolous solutions that Nietzsche's greatness lies, the greatness that
makes him the moral philosopher if the only alternatives to Nietzsche's
moral philosophy turn out to be those formulated by the philosophers
of the Enlightenment and their successors.
(AV: 108)
Nietzsche's moral theorising is essentially reactive (destructive). It is only
because the Enlightenment Project failed that he can take up his position
regarding the Ubermensch. The failure of the Enlightenment Project is the
precondition for the possibility of Nietzsche's critique. Similarly, the
Enlightenment Project to rationally justify morality only began with - chiefly -
the rejection of Aristotelian teleology. If Aristotle is right and the
Enlightenment wrong, then the Nietzscheancritique does not even come into
the picture. "Hence" saysMacIntyre
13
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The defensibility of the Nietzscheanposition turns in the end on the
answer to the question: was it right in the first place to reject Aristotle?
For if Aristotle's position in ethics and politics - or something like it -
could be sustained, the whole Nietzschean enterprise would be
pointless.
(AV: 111)
Finally, we are ready to face the ultimatum that MacIntyre puts on the table.
He says that:
Either one must fol/ow through the aspirations of the Enlightenment
project until there remains only the Nietzschean diagnosis and the
Nietzschean problematic or one must hold that the Enlightenment
project was not only mistaken but should have never commenced in
the first place. There is no third alternative[ ..]
(AV: 111)
MacIntyre opts for the latter option concerning the above ultimatum. His
position is clearly at one with those phuosophers" who are quick to 'rage
against the Enlightenment', liberalism and modernity. According to
MacIntyre, what Enlightenment philosophers never adequately answer, and
Nietzschesees this, is the question, "what sort of person am I to become?"
(AV: 112). Enlightenment philosophersare too concerned with rule following.
This is unsurprising, says MacIntyre, when we recall the consequencesof the
expulsion of Aristotelian teleology from the moral world. MacIntyre believes
that Ronald Dworkin has hit on an important strand of modernity (and
liberalism) when he says, "rules become the primary concept of the moral
life" (AV: 112). In Aristotelian theory, it is the virtues (as moral precepts)
that are fundamental to understanding rules and moreover, how they are
7 This is my emphasis. MacIntyre puts an emphasis (italic) on "either" and "or" in the original
passage.
8 One of whom comes to mind is Martin Heidegger, especially in his views on the danger of
technology in The Question Concerning Technology.
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applied. By contrast, in modernist times, "[q]ualities of character then
generally come to be prized only becausethey will lead us to follow the right
set of rules" (AV: 112). MacIntyre sums up the crux of his argument when he
says:
Hence on the modern view the justification of the virtues depends on
some prior justification of rules and principles; and if the latter become
radically problematic, as they have so also must the former. Suppose
however that in articulating the problems of morality the ordering of
evaluative concepts has been misconceived by the spokesmen of
modernity and more particularly of liberalism; suppose that we need to
attend to the virtues in the first place to understand the function and
authority of rules; we ought then to begin the enquiry in quite a
different way in which it is begun by Hume or Diderot or Kant or Mill.
On this interestingly Nietzscheand Aristotle agree.
(AV: 112)
To return to the nature of the ultimatum, MacIntyre has asked us to choose
between Nietzsche and Aristotle following the demise of the 'Enlightenment
Project'. MacIntyre seesthe task following this ultimatum as twofold. Firstly,
he is obliged to show that the initial rejection of Aristotle's teaching of the
virtues is mistaken and secondly, that the Aristotelian moral tradition can be
rationally vindicated. MacIntyre notes with horror that if Aristotelian moral
theory cannot be rationally vindicated then Nietzsche's stance may be
plausible. (AV: 238). MacIntyre then boldly states his contentions on the
ultimatum. Nietzsche'sstance is unsuccessful against the Aristotelian moral
tradition. If he were to win the ultimatum it would be by default because
both he and MacInyre have shown that contemporary moral arguments can
only be subjective and emotivist in that they are incommensurable. If
Aristotle cannot be vindicated, Nietzschewins. If Nietzschewins there should
be no morality or perhaps less strongly and better, it will be generally
accepted that we will create our own morality (-ies). Yet MacIntyre is quick
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to dispel this possibility when he emphatically says of Nietzsche,"He does not
win." (AV: 239). Why is this so?
For Nietzscheto win the argument by positive argumentation he has to rebut
the case that MacIntyre makes for the social situatedness of the virtues and
substantiate his claims on the will to power and the subjective individualism
of the Ubermensch. MacIntyre asks why it is necessary for Nietzsche's
Ubermensch to take the burden of morality on himself. Why is it necessaryto
create one's own morality? It is MacIntyre's contention that only a self-
absorbed and isolated person would need to do this. It is only in social
context, according to MacIntyre that man's true good exists. Goodscan only
be discovered as a member of a society in which the virtues are central. It is
only when one is cut-off from such a society that one has to take the burden
of morality on oneself. (AV: 240). Nietzsche, according to MacIntyre, does
not adequately grasp that
[tJo cut oneself off from shared activity in which one has initially to
learn obediently as an apprentice learns, to isolate oneself from the
communities which find their point and purpose in such activities, will
be to debar oneself from finding any good outside of oneself.
(AV: 240)
Not only does Nietzschenot win the argument by default, claims MacIntyre,
but it is from the perspective of the tradition of moral solipsism and solitude
that we can best understand where Nietzschemakes his mistakes (AV: 240).
If Nietzsche takes more heed of the normative force of tradition, such
solipsism need not arise. This illustrates the interrelatedness of MacIntyre's
twofold task, namely defending his tradition of the virtues and defeating
Nietzsche's claim to moral subjectivism. It is in defending his notion of
Aristotelian moral tradition, the tradition of the virtues, that MacIntyre can
best defeat Nietzsche.
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Nietzsche'sindividualist position is, MacIntyre suddenly realises (AV: 241), yet
one more movement in the unfolding of liberal individualist modernity.
Nietzsche's fiction, the Ubermensch, represents individualism's final attempt
to escape its own consequences. For it was only in mistakenly rejecting a
social conception of moral theory that the need arises to create the
Ubermensch. MacIntyre now concludes,without repealing the need to retain
and answer this own ultimatum, that it is liberal individualism more than
Nietzschethat is his avowed enemy:
[I]t now tuns out to be the case that in the end the Nietzscheanstance
is only one more facet of that very moral culture of which Nietzsche
took himself to be an implacablecritic. It is therefore after all the case
that the crucial moral opposition is between liberal individualism in
some version or other and the Aristotelian tradition in some version or
other.
(AV: 241)
Tasks beyond After Virtue
With the last words of After Virtue, MacIntyre's self-appointed task of
reclaiming the Aristotelian tradition in moral theory increasingly takes on the
appearance of a knight riding forth with an ancient sacred quest, backed by
the force of a noble tradition:
What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of
community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can
be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us.
And if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the
last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope. This time
however the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they
have been governing us for quite some time. And it is our lack of
consciousness of this that constitutes our predicament. We are not
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waiting for a Godot, but for another - doubtless very different - St
Benedict.
(AV: 245)
MacIntyre concludes After Virtue (1981), the novel-thesis that asks the
fundamental questions that his later works try to answer and expand on, by
giving himself a project: to restate the Aristotelian tradition in such a way that
rationality and intelligibility are restored to moral theorising. In addition, he
concludes that we still lack a rationally defensible and coherent account of
liberal individualism. MacIntyre raises three possible objections to these
conclusions (AV: 241-244):
Firstly, he recognises that his arguments presuppose a particular conception
of rationality. MacIntyre provides this account seven years later with Whose
Justice? Which Rationality? (1988). Secondly, there will be those who find
fault with his treatment of Aristotle. Thirdly, there will be those who deny
that the Aristotelian moral tradition is a viable alternative to those post-
Enlightenment schemes - liberal individualism and modernity. This objection
lies behind the final work in the MacIntyre's trilogy, Three Rival Versions of
Moral Enquiry (1990).
This thesis focuses on possible objections one and three. The adequacy of
MacIntyre's specific treatment of Aristotle falls outside its scope. So far, the
major content of MacIntyre's thesis (for the scope of this thesis) has been
explicated. What remains is to accurately (re-)formulate MacIntyre's chief
contentions and then importantly, to critically evaluate these contentions by
putting a twofold question to MacIntyre.
Problem Statement: a twofold question to MacIntyre
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This thesis seeks to evaluate MacIntyre's claim that recourse to the tradition
of virtue ethics in the Anstotehan-rhomst? sense is the only viable intellectual
option, given the allegeddemise of the so-called"Enlightenment Project".
To recapitulate, according to MacIntyre, the "Enlightenment Project" was not
only a mistake, but "had to fail" because it relinquished a vital
element/presupposition of the fundamental scheme in terms of which moral
theorising takes place, viz. a teleological conception of human nature. Given
the failure of modernist moral theorising, the enlightenment project gives rise
to the situation in which we are confronted with the stark opposites of
Nietzscheand Aristotle. Either one takes recourse to the Aristotelian tradition
of the virtues, uncontaminated by the derailments of modernist thinking, or
one has to recognise that we are entirely the creators of our moral precepts
and intuitions.
This thesis raisesa twofold question:
• First, is it coherent to argue that such a re-appropriation of an ancient
moral tradition is possible? Does such a claim duly reckon with the
conditions under which meaningful forms are understood and applied? In
order to answer this question, the author intends to explore Gadamer's
implied criticism of MacIntyre by constructing a dialogue between the two
thinkers.
• Second, the question is whether the dichotomy of IlNietzsche versus
Aristotle" represents the only viable alternatives for us in our efforts to
continue the enterprise of moral theorising. The author is influenced by
the idea of a third alternative in this regard, inspired by the thought of,
amongst others, thinkers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Richard
Bernstein.
9 While Aristotle is the hero of After Virtue, Thomas Aquinas is the hero of Whose Justice?
Which Rationality? Aquinas is the one to further expand and improve on Aristotle's moral
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Chapter 2 will focus on the first question, namely on the coherence of the re-
appropriation of a moral tradition. The answer to this question is largely to
be found in, amongst other sources, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
Chapter 2 exposes MacIntyre's conception of rationality. The purpose of this
exposition is twofold. Firstly, it presents the preconditions for re-
appropriating an ancient moral scheme. Here, Gadamer's preconditions for
understanding are exposed in order to test critically MacIntyre's preconditions
for understanding a 'foreign' tradition. Secondly, it presents the possibility of
ultimately choosing between moral schemes and their accompanying
rationalities. The chapter also discusses the spectre of relativism in
MacIntyre's conception of rationality and the consequencesthereof.
Chapter 3 will also continue to answer the first question and will specifically
focus on the rationality of the tradition that MacIntyre wants to revive,
namely the Aristotelian-Thomist moral tradition of the virtues. Chapter 3
draws largely on Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. It exposes
MacIntyre's treatment of Encyclopediaand Genealogyas rivals to Tradition in
moral theory and evaluates the extent to which MacIntyre vindicates Tradition
against its rivals.
Chapter 4 answers the second question raised above. It focuses on the
coherence and meaningfulness (or lack thereof) of MacIntyre's "Nietzsche or
Aristotle?" ultimatum. It presents Bernstein's views on the dubious nature of
the ultimatum. This chapter contains the "constructive" element of the thesis
when the author reveals a "third alternative" to the ultimatum based
particularly on the findings in this thesis on Gadamerand Bernstein.
Chapter 5, the conclusion, will (re-)present the findings on the twofold
question that I am posing to MacIntyre. Finally, it will develop the
theory of the virtues.
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constructive side of the thesis, namely the possibility of a third alternative to
the ultimatum.
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2The re-appropriation of an Ancient Moral Tradition
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? - the sequel to After Virtue - is
MacIntyre's attempt to rationally back up two of the major claims of the
latter. After Virtue'sfirst claim is that "we still, in spite of the efforts of three
centuries of moral philosophy and one of sociology, lack any coherent
rationally defensible statement of a liberal individualist point of view". The
second claim is that "the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a way that
restores rationality and intelligibility to our own moral and social attitudes and
commitments" (WJWR: Preface). After Virtue requires an account of
practical rationality that can support these claims and it is necessary for
MacIntyre to elucidate
both what makes it rational to act in one way rather than another and
what makes it rational to advance and defend one conception of
rationality rather than another.
(WJWR:Preface)
The question whether it is coherent to re-appropriate an ancient moral
tradition as MacIntyre does presupposes an adequate understanding of
rationality. The major two-fold question asked in this chapter is "what is the
nature of rationality?" and "what are the pre-conditions for understanding
traditions, choosing between them and ultimately re-appropriating one of
them?" By closely linking practical rationality and tradition, MacIntyre follows
in the footsteps of thinkers like Hans-GeorgGadarner.' What then, according
to MacIntyre, is the nature of rationality?
1 The latter has an aversion to the schism between - or anti-thesis of tradition and rationality,
as advocated by the Enlightenment Project. Gadamer points out that the Enlightenment is
responsible for both the negative connotations associated with the notion of "prejudice" and
the negative implications of any recourse to tradition as a legitimate authority (Warnke, 1987:
75). For him, the Enlightenment is simply 'prejudiced against prejudice'. MacIntyre, like
Gadamer (see Warnke, 1987: 75-82), tries to rehabilitate prejudice and tradition (although
MacIntyre never really refers to 'tradition' as 'prejudice' - presumably to avoid its negative
contemporary connotations) as necessary components of rationality.
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Multiple Rationalities
MacIntyre's chief target in the rationality debate is the old, dead and decaying
donkey that has been (since its conception during the Enlightenment) and
continues to be tethered and flogged. I am referring to, of course,
disinterested, impartial, value-free, tradition-free, universal reason. Few
philosophers, I imagine, would stand by this chimera today.'
The 'Enlightenment' notion of rationality requires, according to MacIntyre,
that we arrive at impartial reason, devoid of prejudice and partisanship. This
requirement, however, according to MacIntyre, is question begging. It is
itself historical in that it presupposesa specific account of justice - namely
that of Liberal Individualism. Similarly, 'Enlightenment' rationality justifies the
notion of justice as Liberal Individualism. For MacIntyre, 'Enlightenment'
rationality and its corresponding theory of justice are used to justify each
other. The so-called neutrality of this type of rationality is a chimera. It tries
to envisage a conception of arriving at a notion of rationality that any socially
disembodied being would arrive at whilst ignoring the social context in which
the notion arises. It illegitimately ignores, so MacIntyre's constant refrain
chants, the inescapable historical and social situatedness of any theory of
rationality and life and meaning in general. (WJWR:3-4).
Not unlike the 'modern muddle concerning morality and moral theory' (see
the introduction and After Virtue), there exists a 'muddle' concerning the
Enlightenment conception of (unified) rationality. The muddle is that the
historical and social circumstances in which such a notion arises are often
ignored, forgotten or denied to exist. Why is it, MacIntyre asks, that in the
2 Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, represents a similar contemporary
attempt to undermine the notion of a 'pure', universal rationality. For Rorty, as for
MacIntyre, this notion is the outcome of a series of historical events and cannot be extricated
from the historical context in which it arises. Rorty (1980: 9) explicitly states that there is
nothing new about this idea and that it is the message common in philosophers such as
Wittgenstein, Dewey and Heidegger.
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realm of practical ratlonalltv' and justice" (like morality), there is not only
dissent but mere 'arguing past one another' - by assertion and counter
assertion? Macintyre formulates the Enlightenment conception of rationality
when he says that:
It was a central aspiration of the enlightenment, an aspiration the
formulation of which was itself a great achievement, to provide for
debate in the public realm standards and methods of rational
justification by which alternative courses of action in every sphere of
life could be adjudged just or unjust, rational or irrational, enlightened
or unenlightened. So, it was hoped, reason would replace authority
and tradition. Rational justification was to appeal to principles
undeniable by any rational person and therefore independent of all
those social and cultural particularities which the Enlightenment
thinkers took to be the mere accidental clothing of reason in particular
times and places.
(WJWR: 6)
The problem with the Enlightenment Project, according to MacIntyre, is that
thinkers have always disagreed as to what precisely the above-mentioned
principles are or what they could be, In fact such disagreement has grown
over time." The legacy of the enlightenment has been to provide ideal
standards of rational justification that it has been unable to sustain and live
up to," In light of this, MacIntyre wants to discontinue the 'Enlightenment
3 This is simply rationality that is applied to a context in which a rational choice must be made
between alternatives.
4 For MacIntyre, these two notions go hand in hand as two components that mutually
constitute and refer to each other.
5 Different answers as to what 'rational principles' might be have been given, according to
MacIntyre (WJWR: 6), by: 1) the authors of the Encyclopedia (see chapter 3),2) Rousseau,
3) Bentham, 4) Kant and 5) Scottish 'common sense' philosophers and their French and
American counterparts.
6 In anticipation of later criticisms of MacIntyre's rejection of Enlightenment ideals, it is
necessary to note at this point that just because it looks like the Enlightenment Project fails in
practice does not rule out the possibility that it may succeed at a later stage. MacIntyre does
not make this concession at this stage, although he inexplicitly makes it in Three Rival
Versions of Moral Enquiry. In this book he partly concedes that it is impossible to definitively
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Project' thus described and moves towards an alternative understanding of
rationality. This understanding is an attempt to re-capture that which the
Enlightenment has made us blind to, namely
a conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition, a
conception according to which the standards of rational justification
themselves emerge from and are part of a history in which they are
vindicated by the way in which they transcend the limitations of and
provide remedies for the defects of their predecessors within the
history of that same tradition.
(WJWR:7. My emphasis.)
According to MacIntyre, there are multiple rationalities competing for our
allegiance. This is not to say that all traditions are equally acceptable. Not all
traditions have immersed themselves in rational thinking. Enlightenment
thinkers have justifiably rejected some traditions, in that they are the
antithesis of reason. How then is a conception of rationality rationally
justified?
MacIntyre says that his conception of rationality is essentially historical.
Rational justification involves the narration of how a tradition's enquiry has
developed so far. In other words, the level of rationality or rational
development of a tradition is relative to its own previous development. There
is no way of judging development that is not relative to the best
developments achieved so far in a tradition. What counts as "best
developments" is again relative to the accepted standards as to what counts
as development and progress. These standards have been hammered out
historically and are the best standards achieved by a tradition so far. Here,
rule out the plausibility of traditions rivaling the Arsistotelian-Thomist tradition. This also pre-
empts the ultimatum question posed in chapter 4. If there are possibilities of understanding
other than those advocated by MacIntyre, why does he need to be so dogmatiC as to propose
an ultimatum? Another issue raised by MacIntyre's conception of the 'Enlightenment Project'
is whether it really purports to be as unified (polarised) a notion as he makes it out to be.
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the issue of relativism raises its head. Intra-paradigm rationality can only
exist in the form of the extent to which a framework of thinking justifies itself
against previous attempts to articulate that framework. The claims of a
theory are justified by reference to its framework of thinking or first
principles. MacIntyre recognisesthe relativism in rationality when he says:
But what justifies the first principles themselves, or rather the whole
structure of theory of which they are a part, is the rational superiority
of that particular structure to all previous attempts within that
particular tradition to formulate such theories and principles; it is not a
matter of those first principles being acceptable to all rational persons
whatsoever - unless we were to include in the condition of being a
rational person an apprehension of and identification with the kind of
history whose culmination is the construction of this particular
theoretical structure, as perhaps Aristotle, for example, in some
measuredid.
(WJWR: 8)
At this initial stage, MacIntyre seems to say that rationality is only relative to
a tradition's capacity to explain its earlier self more adequately. This does not
seem to help. We still need to know what the criteria are for a 'more
adequate' narrative and also what is to count as a 'progressive' narrative.
Otherwise, the tradition is self-justifying and question- begging. It seems to
need 'external' standards by which its standards can be judged. Or are these
questions a result of the remnants of Enlightenment 'propaganda'? These
questions will be hammered out in the section on 'relativism'.
Let me finish off by stating a few caveats regarding MacIntyre's historical
conception of rationality. MacIntyre does not claim that some claims cannot
appear in different contexts. He does not claim that timeless truths cannot
For a critical stance on MacIntyre's notion of the "Enlightenment Project", see Robert
Wokler's article, "Projecting the Enlightenment".
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exist. Rather, notions like 'rationality' and 'timeless truth' are concepts with a
history, concepts used in differing contexts. Rationality, says MacIntyre, is a
concept with a history and as such there will be multiple rationalities as there
are multiple traditions of enquiry, each with its own history. (WJWR:8-9).
The picture MacIntyre has painted of multiple traditions with multiple
conceptions of rationality and inquiry seems, so MacIntyre anticipates, to the
proponents of Enlightenment reason, to be less likely to solve any issuesthan
Enlightenment thinking. MacIntyre seems to present a fragmented world of
many diverse traditions in which much disagreement is unavoidable. "Is this
world not more 'muddled' than the one (world) we propose?" Enlightenment
thinkers may ask. To this, MacIntyre's reply is that such 'relativism' is, and
this will become clearer with further argument, the precondition for rational
understandlnq.' (WJWR:9-10).
Tradition(s) and rationality (ies)
An exploration of the rationality of traditions requires not only intra-, but also
inter-paradigmatic criteria by which the legitimacy of a tradition can be
upheld. MacIntyre looks to 'foreign' traditions in order legitimate and amend
one's own dear-held tradition. For MacIntyre,
there is no standing ground, no place for enquiry, no way to engage in
the practices of advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting
reasoned argument apart from that which is provided by some
particular tradition or other.
7 In "Relativism, Power and Philosophy", MacIntyre goes as far as to claim that the
Enlightenment ideal of detaching oneself from one's own perspective/viewpoint - "view[ing]
our own particularly modern viewpoint from a vantage point outside itself' - (MacIntyre,
1987: 404) cannot be accomplished by ideal Enlightenment rationality. It can only be
achieved by recognising that which is relative to another culture, that what is untranslatable
in our own language! We can only understand that which is untranslatable (and specifically
why, culturally speaking it is untranslatable) by understanding a culture like anthropologists
do - from its roots up. One needs relativism to truly understand another culture, learning its
customs and language as a 'second first language'.
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(WJWR:350)
A tradition justifies itself internally (intra-paradigm justification) by providing
rational justification for its central theses at each stage of its development.
This justification is on its own terms. Such a tradition defines itself using its
own concepts and standards. For MacIntyre, there is no set of independent,
neutral standards to which a tradition can appeal to vindicate itself against
others. This does not mean that issues between traditions cannot be
decided". On the contrary, for MacIntyre, it is precisely when we recognise
the partly relative nature of inquiry that we can coherently choose between
traditions. I call MacIntyre's understanding 'partly relative' because he does
not (and cannot logically) deny that competing traditions do share some 'core'
standards." The major traditions that compete for our allegiance must have
some common standards and logic. "Were it not so," says MacIntyre (WJWR:
351), "their adherents would be unable to disagree (my emphasis) in the way
in which they do.,,10
8 However, MacIntyre is later to make remarks in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry to the
effect that no tradition can ever be definitivelyvindicated or refuted. There is always the
possibility, sc MacIntyre allows, of a once discredited tradition vindicating itself. MacIntyre
says that we can only give the best reasons so farfor our support of a tradition. This is
because (and this will be spelt out in more detail later) traditions can only vindicate
themselves (or show their incoherence) retrospectivelyor historically.
9 Many philosophical anthropologists have argued that there is a basic 'core' of understanding
between cultures. This 'core' provides the possibility of translation and the possibility of
hearing at least some of what a 'foreign' culture is saying. Many of the authors in Hollis and
Lukes's collection of essays on the rationality debate, Rationality and Relativism, hold this
view. It can be alternatively named as a ''theory of commensurability or of "bridgeheads"
between worldviews or ontologies" (Mascio, 1994: 133).
10 Says MacIntyre (WJWR: 4):
Aristotle argued in Book Gamma of the Metaphysicsthat anyone who denies the
basic law of logic, the law of noncontradiction, and who is prepared to defend his or
her position by entering into argumentative debate, will in fact be unable to avoid
relying on the very law which he or she purports to reject. And it may be that for
laws of logic parallel defenses can be constructed. But even if Aristotle was
successful, and I believe he was, in showing that no-one who understands the laws
of logic can remain rational while rejecting them, observance of the laws of logic is
only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for rationality, whether theoretical or
practical. It is on what has to be added to observance of the laws of logic to justify
ascriptions of rationality - whether to oneself or to others, whether to modes of
enquiry or to justifications of belief, or to courses of action and their justification -
that disagreement arises concerning the fundamental nature of rationality and
extends into disagreement over how it is rationally appropriate to proceed in the face
of those disagreements.
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The Absolute knowledge of the Hegelian system is from this tradition-
constituted standpoint a chimera." No one at any stage can ever rule
out the future possibility of their present beliefs and judgements being
shown to be inadequate in a variety of ways."
(WJWR:361)
The rationality of a tradition is called into question, according to MacIntyre,
when it lacks the narrative resources to explain its own incoherences and
problems. MacIntyre calls this an "epistemological crisis" - another concept
he borrows from the philosophy of science. Such a crisis occurs internally i.e.
when a tradition fails to make progress by its own standards. The successful
resolution of such crises represents for MacIntyre one of the surest signs that
a tradition is making progress. (WJWR: 361-362). Previous historical truths
or certitudes being brought into question mark an epistemological crisis.
MacIntyre's work on epistemological crises is being presented with the
(somewhat inexplicit) intention of providing the preconditions for a rational
vindication of an ancient tradition - the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of the
virtues. It is to be MacIntyre's claim, as made explicit in ThreeRival Versions
of Moral Enquiry, that the last mentioned tradition is the one that best
overcomes the problems generated by its predecessors. The "Enlightenment
Project" fails, according to MacIntyre, because it both lacks the resources to
explain its own incoherences (and specifically lands up with the "modern
muddle" concerning morality - see Introduction) and does not solve its
predecessor's difficulties in their own terms. To return to MacIntyre's
13 MacIntyre here uses Richard Rorty's pet word from Philosophyand the Mirror of Nature-
"chimera". The "and" in Rorty's book tells us much of what it is about. I take it to mean,
"Philosophy is notthe mirror of nature" i.e. it cannot (re)present reality exactly as it exists.
MacIntyre here wholeheartedly agrees with this point.
14 Again, to pre-empt the issue of the coherence of MacIntyre's "either/or" ultimatum,
MacIntyre will get himself into trouble with this claim. If one imposes a self-reflexive criticism
on this point, then MacIntyre's cherished beliefs may be refuted (in part or in whole) at some
later stage. I will later hold MacIntyre to his point and ask: why then does he need to
propose a non-negotiable ultimatum if in principle it should be open to dispute? MacIntyre's
words will come back to haunt him when I take him up on this offer and reconsider the
coherence of the ultimatum.
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MacIntyre seems to draw on the philosophy of science to complete his
account of the internal justification of a tradition. A tradition's truth claims
can be vindicated only with regard to the possibility of their falsification.ll A
truth claim that cannot be falsified cannot be rationally vlndlcated." Or
rather when its proponents are unable to state the conditions under which a
truth claim may be falsified, it cannot be rationally vindicated. MacIntyre's
own formulation of this idea is that the test for truth is to summon up as
many objections of the greatest strength possible, to a truth claim. What we
can justifiably hold as true are those claims that have withstood dialectical
questioning and possibleobjections. (WJWR:358). Although MacIntyre says
that the truths we arrive at will be the best truths proposed so far, he does
not want to detract from the permanence and universality of such claims.
The claim that a truth claim makes, is that the intellectual inadequacy of its
predecessors is a situation that will never again be repeated, no matter how
extensive and exhaustive the enquiry is (WJWR: 358). Even though rational
enquiry is perspectival in that theories will differ from tradition to tradition,
traditions will tend to recognisewhat is common between them. It is simply
that in the development of traditions that common characteristic, if not
universal patterns, will appear (WJWR:359).
For MacIntyre, first principles are justified dialectically and historically. "They
are justified insofar as in the history of the tradition they have, by surviving
the process of dialectical questioning, vindicated themselves as superior to
their historical predecessors" (WJWR: 360). First principles cannot be self-
sufficient, self-justifying epistemological first principles. There cannot be a
final truth in which the mind is adequate to its objects:
II MacIntyre never, as far as I can recall, uses the word ''falsification'' in this context.
"Falsification" does, I believe, best encapsulate what he is getting at.
12 Many of Freud's theories seem to be 'undisprovable' or not open to falsification, as such
they cannot be called "scientific".
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explanation of the vindication of the Aristotelian- Thomist tradition: what
would the solution to an epistemological crisis require?
New theories and concepts that meet three precise requirements, says
MacIntyre, will have to be introduced:
1. New theories and concepts must furnish a solution to the previously
insoluble problematic that constituted the epistemological crisis.
2. They must be able to explain why the tradition initially lapsed into
incoherence or sterility.
3. Tasks 1. and 2. must be fundamentally continuous with the conceptual
scheme of the tradition in epistemological crisis. In other words, there
cannot be a 'total revolution' in thought. Some common 'core' or
epistemological 'bridgehead' must remain. (WJWR: 362).
What then, according to MacIntyre, is the nature of these 'solutions' to
epistemological crises? The 'new' conceptual structures in a tradition that has
successfully passed through an epistemological crisis will be richer than
previous structures, escaping their llrmtattons." They will thus in no way be
derivable from the original structures - imaginative conceptual innovation will
have had to occur. It is only in retrospectthat one can see the logic behind a
solution to an epistemological crisis. Consider MacIntyre's example of an
epistemological crisis in science. It concerns Boltzmann and Bohr.
Botlzman derives, in 1890, a number of paradoxes from accounts of thermal
energy. These accounts are framed by classical mechanics. These paradoxes
cannot be solved by the traditional scheme, which is to result in an
epistemological crisis. At the same time, Bohr proposes his theory of the
internal structure of the atom. The point is that the scientists in that day do
15 This is precisely why MacIntyre advocates Aquinas over its two main predecessors, namely
the Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions. Aquinas provides the resources to blend the latter
two traditions. Without Aquinas' scheme both the Augustinian scheme and the Aristotelian
scheme cannot coherently exist side by side (WJWR: 363).
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not recognise that there is a crisis between Boltzmann's and Bohrs' theories.
Bohr's theory is only recognised as a solution to a crisis in retrospect. It is
only when the content of quantum mechanicsis hammered out that the crisis
becomesvisible. SaysMacIntyre:
The power of quantum mechanics lies not only in its freedom from the
difficulties and incoherenceswhich came to afflict classical mechanics
but also in its ability to furnish an explanation of why the problematic
of classical mechanics was bound in the end to engender just such
insoluble problems as that discovered by Boltzmann... To have passed
through an epistemological crisis successfullyenables the adherents of
a tradition to rewrite its history in a more insightful way.16
(WJWR: 363)
The relativist challenge
The preceding passages represent MacIntyre's attempt to balance out the
subjectivism and relativism implied in the intra-paradigm conception of
rationality. On this conception, the relativist may argue that if a tradition can
only look to its own internal resources, it will always vindicate itself, since it
itself provides the standards of internal justification (WJWR: 364 and 352-
354). MacIntyre claims to refute this type of relativism by showing how a
tradition can develop rationally inter-paradigmatically following an
epistemological crisis. He says that:
Every tradition, whether it recognisesit or not, confronts the possibility
that at some future time it will fall into a state of epistemological crisis,
recognisable as such by its own standards of rational justification,
16 An interesting parallel with this idea is that most historical concepts gain much of their
meaning retrospectively. When, for example, does the First World War (the actual events
that took place) become known as "World War One" (the historical narrative on the events
that took place)? The answer is only after the completion of the Second World War! Shortly
after the period 1914-1918, the war is rather known as, inter-alia, ''the war to end all wars"
and in the inter-war period, simply as "the Great War".
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which have themselves been vindicated up to that time as the best to
emerge from the history of that particular tradition.
(WJWR:364)
MacIntyre tries to avoid the relativistic overtones of what Colby (1995: 54)
calls MacIntyre's "constitution thesis", the thesis that
There is no standing ground, no place for inquiry, no way to engage in
the practices of advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting
reasoned argument apart from that which is provided by some
tradition or other... There is no evaluatively neutral understanding of
rationality; even conceptions of rational justification are historically
transformed. (Colby paraphrasing MacIntyre, 1995: 54).
MacIntyre then tries to avoid relativism, i.e. the idea that there are simply
many rival traditions, each with its own internal standards of rationality, by
identifying rationality with progressiveness in crisis resolution.
The first question to pose to MacIntyre is whether the "constitution thesis" is
not relativistic in that it could be inherently conservative. Why should a
tradition fall into an epistemological crisis on its own terms? Surely it can
avoid crises by simply continuing to (self) justify its own theses>" Colby
(1995: 55) similarly raises two points in this regard. Firstly, each tradition
must fix for itself and itself alone, the criteria for what is to count as an
epistemological crisis. How then do we know when a real epistemological
crisis occurs? Secondly, a tradition must likewise decide on the criteria for
deciding what is to count as a 'progressive' solution to the crisis. Colby's first
objection is not particularly hard-hitting. MacIntyre himself gives many
17 MacIntyre says that he is not concerned with traditions that have not developed to the
point at which epistemological crises have become a possibility (WJWR: 366)
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examples in which sufficiently self-reflective paradigms experience crises on
their own terms.is Colby'smore interesting point is his latter.
The problem with Colby's criticism of the constitution thesis is that he comes
across as a hard-nosed 'absolute' rationalist. Just because MacIntyre
proposes that there is 'no tradition/context-independent way of viewing the
world' does not mean there is either absolute epistemological relativism or
absolute, universal rationality. Contra COlby19, MacIntyre does not rule out
the possibility of universal truths". The issue is far subtler than Colby allows.
That Colby's absolute, context-free rationality is what is needed to choose
between traditions, is simply wronq". Sucha notion has been well refuted."
Colby's 'good side' is simply to point out that the apparent success of a
tradition in overcoming an epistemological crisis can only ultimately be judged
relative to the tradition concerned. It is true that it is also judged relative to
its rivals, but this is done only in terms of its own standards.
MacIntyre seemscorrect to propose that that epistemological crises can arise
on a tradition's own terms. This has historical support, as does the idea that
traditions will not always have the resourcesto solve their own problems. He
adequately handles the relativist charge that because traditions have their
18Another example is how Galileo and Newton overcome the crises inherent in the medieval
physics of nature (WJWR: 365).
191995: 55
2°WJWR: 9
21The notion of universal, contextless rationality proposes to be outside of all tradition. The
rationalist in this sense faces the same predicament as the perspectivist Madntyre (WJWR:
367) says that, "The person outside of all traditions lacks sufficient rational resources for
enquiry and a fortiorifor enquiry into what tradition is to be rationally preferred ... To be
outside of all traditions is to be a stranger to enquiry; it is to be in a state of intellectual and
moral destitution[.]"
22For a thorough debunking of these notions see Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
A caveat to the definitive refutation of 'absolute' rationality must be made however. I give
this caveat as a parallel to the case MacIntyre makes in "Relativism, Power and Philosophy"
against the definitive refutation of relativism:
Nothing is perhaps a surer sign that a doctrine embodies some not-to-be-neglected
truth than in the course of philosophy it should have been refuted again and again.
Genuinely refutable doctrines only need to be refuted once.
(RPP: 385)
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own internal accounts of rationality, they cannot challenge or defeat or be
defeated by other traditions. The type of relativism that he falls prey to is,
following Colby's article, that he cannot tell us that we can know for sure
when we are making progress in rational enquiry. If MacIntyre cannot do
this, how can he rationally propose that the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition
must be revived? Surely it must be revived becauseit holds better promise of
"progress'?! Yet "progress" on whose terms? "Progress" can only be
progress on Aristotelian-Thomist terms. Sure, MacIntyre convinces us that
the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition represents progress - but only if we are
Aristotelian-Thomists. Relativising progress will simply not do when we have
to decide between multiple traditions and rationalities all competing for our
allegiance.
Colby is wrong to assume that without the "neutral criteria of rationality"
(Colby, 1995: 60), each tradition is simply self-justifying and that there is
neither victory nor defeat nor any compelling reasons to change from one
traditlonto another." It does not follow that traditions cannot dialectically
encounter each other or that real argumentation cannot occur. Contra Colby,
MacIntyre's 'relativist' account of rationality is not simply question begging or
incoherent". MacIntyre's rationality thesis certainly survives the major
relativist challenge, but at a cost.
MacIntyre wants to make a claim, available to all rational persons, that we
simply must re-appropriate the ancient Aristotelian-Thomist moral tradition.
For MacIntyre it is simply the rational thing to do. Yet MacIntyre holds that
we cannot be sure that it is the rational thing to do, since it may be proved
unwise retrospectively. MacIntyre cannot have it both ways. He cannot
simultaneously relativise epistemology (knowledge about knowledge) and
23 It is ironic that MacIntyre warns against such terms as "victory" and "defeat". For him,
they represent 'absolute' Enlightenment thinking. The irony is that he does exactly this when
proposing his "either-or" ultimatum in After Virtue.
24 Colby never explicitly refers to it thus.
35
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
make universal epistemological claims. On this point, I agree with Colby
(1995: 60-61). MacIntyre cannot coherently maintain that to
genuinely...adopt the standpoint of a tradition thereby commits one to
its view of what is true and false and, in so committing one, prohibits
one from adopting any rival standpoint.
(WJWR:367)
MacIntyre's main thesis with regard to the nature of rationality is that
rationality is only available to us in and through traditions (WJWR: 369). For
MacIntyre, the possibility of re-appropriating another 'foreign' or 'ancient'
tradition therefore lies for him in the attempt to firstly understand that
tradition. This understanding is essentially steeped in language, since there is
no pre-conceptual way of understanding the world. The precondition for
understanding another tradition is to adequately understand its language and
its linguistic community. It is only when we understand traditions' languages
from the inside-out that that we can ultimately choose between them.
The preconditions for understanding a 'foreign' tradition
The major point of understanding another tradition for MacIntyre is that the
other tradition may offer, on our own standards, superior resources for
understanding, explaining and solving our problems (WJWR: 370). This is
preciselywhat MacIntyre claims for the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition.
The first precondition for understanding the last-mentioned tradition and
'other' traditions in general, as competing with and rival to ours (the post-
Enlightenment moral tradition or whatever it happens to be) is that the
traditions understand each other to a significant degree. Without a 'common
core' of understanding, there are simply multiple, totally incommensurable
schemes (schemes with 'no common measure') that 'talk past one another'
rather than 'talk to one another'.
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MacIntyre uses, inter-alia, Donald Davidson's account of translatability to
hammer out the very basics of being able to talk to one another. Following
Davidson, MacIntyre says that translatability entails (at least partial)
commensurability. Such commensurability is essumed." In Davidson's
words, "flndinq the common core is not subsequent to understanding, but a
condition of it." (WJWR:370).
MacIntyre focuseson the understanding of traditions that are very different to
our own, as is the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. To understand such a
tradition requires the simultaneous understanding of both culture and
language. Thesesactivities are not independent for MacIntyre (WJWR: 374).
Becauselanguage is steeped in culture (and there is a hermeneutic interplay
between the two), one first has to be initiated into the foreign tradition as a
native child might be.
MacIntyre follows anthropologists' lead by saying that in order to truly
understand a tradition, one must understand the culture 'from the inside out'
- as a native does. One has to metaphorically become a child again, learning
the language and culture as a first language. In our case, we can only learn
the language as a "second first language".26
For MacIntyre, 'deep' translation (Le. translation that can generate meaning
as opposed to the translation that occurs in, for example, travelers' phrase
25 For a very interesting and detailed debate of the preconditions for the possibility of
translation see Hollis and Lukes' (eds) Rationality and Relativism and Masoio's critical
narrative on the debate in chapter 6 of African Philosophy in Search of Identity. The
conclusion that Hollis and Lukes come up with in commenting on the essays is that the
"bridgehead" of common rationality is both given a priori and assumed.
26 The idea of learning a culture as a native does is taken from Winch's famous article, "On
understanding a primitive society" (1964). This article represents Winch's culminated
thoughts on an earlier work, The idea of a social science (1958). According to A.A. van
Niekerk (1992: 43), Winch's ideas that there are not trans-cultural standards of rationality,
that we live in "different worlds" and that the social sciences are doomed to relativism, are
nonsense. For a thorough criticism of Winch's denial of trans-cultural standards of rationality,
see Van Niekerk (1992: 39-44). It is only if we live in completely different worlds that that
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books") does not occur by matching sentences with sentences. This is not
how a child learns a language, for it possessesno prior sentencesof its own!
(WJWR: 374). To truly understand the Aristotelian-Thomist moral tradition,
we must learn it form the roots up or as a "second first language". The big
question to pose to MacIntyre here is whether it is possible, given the
preconditions for understanding, to really understand another tradition by
learning its language as a "second first language". The exposition of
Gadamer'spreconditions for understanding that is still to come will shed some
light on this.
How is it possible that we twenty-first century beings can transform ourselves
into native inhabitants of the Aristotelian-Thomist moral tradition? Even
though this is no longer a 'living' tradition, MacIntyre says that it has
sufficient texts for us to become "surrogate" inhabitants (WJWR: 374). The
test, says MacIntyre, of whether one has understood a tradition well is
whether one can pass as for example, as a Thomisf8, improvising what
Aquinas might say in a situation. The judges of this test can only be the best
contemporary scholars on Aquinas. Knowledge of this tradition can only be
judged relative to the highest authority on Aquinas - an authority that is the
best so far, in accordanceto Thomist Standards.
An important characteristic of a person who understands a tradition well, says
MacIntyre (WJWR: 375), is that he understands what is untranslatable from
one language to another and why. This ability results from the adequate
learning of a culture from the roots up. In some cases, choosing between
one phrase and another means choosing between two (at least partly
incommensurable) conceptual schemes and two different ways of life.
Consider an example, given by MacIntyre, regarding the significance of
language in that age-old feud between the Englishand Irish.
we need to learn foreign traditions as a native might do, even though this is, I will show,
following Gadamer, also nonsensical when one considers the preconditions for understanding.
27 This example is taken from RPP: 391
28 This is my own fictitious example.
38
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
There are two rival place names - "Doire Columcille" in Irish and
"Londonderrry" in English. The former refers to the identity of a place given
to it by an Irish and Catholic community since it became St. Columbia's oak
grave in 564. The latter refers to the identity of a place given to it by an
Englishand Protestant community in the seventeenth century. To use either
of the rival names is to deny the legitimacy of the other. "Londonderry"
cannot be translated by either "Doire Columcille" or "St. Columbia's oak
grave". There are no such names in English. To use either presupposes
allegiance to one way of viewing the world or another way of viewing the
world. There simply is not reference to one and the same place in the
absenceof communal backgrounds. Madntyre says:
So the conception of pure reference, of reference as such, arises as the
artifact of a particular type of social and cultural order, one in which a
minimum of shared beliefs and allegiancescan be presupposed.
(WJWR:379)
The type of relativism generated by this predicament is not seen as a
stumbling block to rational enquiry for MacIntyre. It is indeed a necessary
precondition for rational enquiry. It is precisely by the grace of relativism that
we see other traditions in a 'new light':
[W]hen we learn the languages of certain radically different cultures, it
is in the course of discovering what is untranslatable in them that we
learn not only how to occupy alternative viewpoints, but in terms of
those viewpoints to frame questions to which under certain conditions
a version of relativism is the inescapableanswer. And in so doing we
are also able to learn how to view our own peculiarly modern
standpoint from a vantagepoint outside itself. (My emphasis).
(RPP:404)
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Overcoming relativism, for MacIntyre, involves embracing it. The attempt to
do away with all relativism itself falls prey to a more dangerous type of
relativism. What the languages of modernity presuppose is that its audience
does not possessanyframework of common, shared belief (WJWR:384-385).
The texts typical of the languages of modernity translate other languages at
the cost of rendering them at least partly unintelligible to the adherents of
those other languages. It is not simply that the languages of modernity
distort by translating out of context, says MacIntyre (WJWR: 385), but
moreover that this is invisible to those whose first first language is one of the
internationalised languagesof modernity. For MacIntyre, it is a defining belief
of modernity that there is nothing that is not translatable into its
internaltionalised languages. The principle of untranslatability is unintelligible
to the adherents of modernity or put otherwise, it is a philosophical fiction.
What MacIntyre's preconditions for understanding wants to allow can be seen
as a direct attack on Post-Enlightenment modernity or on modernity as the
heir of the Enlightenment. Another defining belief of modernity, according to
MacIntyre (WJWR: 385), is that it believes that it can understand anything,
no matter how alien. As such, the translation characteristic of modernity
generates a misunderstandingof tradlnon."
Eventhe postmodernists make a meal of trying to get at an adequate account
of rationality and translation. MacIntyre takes Roland Barthes to task for
describing texts as detached from their original context. For Barthes, this is
what texts always are. For MacIntyre, this is an account of texts from a
peculiarly postmodern stance. SaysBarthes (1966: 56):
29 Macntyre says, concerning our (western, post-Enlightenment) education, that it
is not and cannot be a reintroduction to the culture of past traditions but is a tour
through what is in effect a museum of texts, each rendered contextiess and therefore
other than its original by being placed on a cultural pedestal.
(WJWR: 386)
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[T]he work is without circumstance and it is indeed perhaps what
defines it best: the work is not circumscribed, designated, protected,
directed by any situation, no practical life is there to tell it what
meaning to give it... in it ambiguity is wholly pure: however extended
it may be, it possessessomething of the brevity of the priestesses of
Apollo, sayings conforming to a first code (the priestess did not rave)
and yet open to a number of meanings, for they were uttered outside
every situation - except indeed the situation of ambiguity[.]
In contrast to both modernists and postmodernists, MacIntyre proposes that
progress in rationality can only be made when we discover what is
untranslatable between languagesand why. Discovering the inaccessibleand
untranslatable requires, to recapitulate, two stages (WJWR:387):
1. Acquiring a secondfirst language by learning a culture 'from the roots up'.
2. Learning what cannot be translated from the second first language into
the first first language.
MacIntyre's scheme of translation and rationality is essentially one of
'openness'. He says that
the only rational way for the adherents of any tradition to approach
intellectually, culturally, and linguistically alien rivals is that one allows
for the possibility that in one or more areas the other may be rationally
superior to it in respect precisely of that in the alien tradition which it
cannot as yet comprehend.
(WJWR:388)
MacIntyre rages against what I take to be the 'homogenising' effect of the
Enlightenment. We have, ever since the Enlightenment, says MacIntyre
(RPP: 409), been too quick to congratulate ourselves on our success in
discovering that they (those foreign and alien cultures) are just like us. We
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have imputed our standards to them, thus making their behaviour intelligible
not by their standards, but by ours. The problem with post- Enlightenment
rationality is that it is too self-justifying. It precludes the two most important
elements of rational justification, the possibility of falsification and the
possibility of untranslatability. MacIntyre says that
[o]nly those whose tradition allows for the possibility of its hegemony
being put in question can have rational warrant for asserting such a
hegemony. And only those traditions whose adherents recognise the
possibility of untranslatability into their own language in use are able to
reckon adequately with that possibility.
(WJWR: 388)
MacIntyre's preconditions for understanding and translation argue for an
account of practical rationality. This practical rationality is needed in order to
choose between competing traditions. It is the resource necessary to show
why the Aristotelian-Thomist moral tradition should be resurrected above its
rivals. This account will be spelled out further in the final section on, "the
preconditions for rationally choosing between traditions" and in the rationale
behind the resurrection of the Aristotelian-Thomist moral tradition as exposed
in chapter 3. In his argument thus far, MacIntyre has argued for liberation
from Enlightenment rationality and its corresponding incoherent anti-
relativism.3D MacIntyre's (re-) uniting of tradition and rationality proposes
that
rationality requires a readiness on our part to accept, and indeed to
welcome, a possible defeat of the forms of theory and practice in
which it has up till now been taken to be embodied within our own
tradition, at the hands of some alien and perhaps even as yet largely
unintelligible tradition of thought and practice; and this is an
30 It is precisely this anti-relativism that makes plausible those genealogical theories that
identify every form of rationality with some contending form of power (RPP: 409).
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acknowledgement of which the traditions that we inherit have too
seldom been capable.
(RPP: 409)
MacIntyre's argument on the preconditions for understanding ends at a point
at which it has much in common with Hans-Georg Gadamer's conclusions
(although there are similarities throughout). It can be assumed that
MacIntyre has an extensive knowledge of Gadamer, extending at least as far
back to his 1976 article, "Contexts of interpretation: Reflections on Hans-
Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method'. The purpose of the following section
on Gadamer's preconditions for understanding is threefold. Firstly, it serves
as a critical reflection on and amendment to MacIntyre's thought. Secondly,
it updates and expands on MacIntyre's initial encounter with Gadamer's Truth
and Method. Thirdly, it deals with the question that this chapter tries to
answer in part, namely, "Is it coherent to re-appropriate an ancient moral
tradition?"
Gadamer's conditions under which meaningful forms are
understood'"
The previous sections can be summed up into a number of claims that
MacIntyre makes on how we can rationally understand, in order to possibly
vindicate or re-appropriate, another tradition:
1. An epistemological crisis occurs within a tradition when it falls into
incoherenceon its own terms. When a tradition lacks the resources to
explain its own faltering condition, it looks to other traditions to solve
its crises on its own terms.
31 The nature of Gadamer's hermeneutics has to be carefully articulated so as not to distort
his claims .: Gadamer's theories are in essence descriptive. He describes what is the case
when we understand (well).
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II. Another tradition can only be engaged in dialogue by learning its
culture and language. It's culture must be learned as a child learns its
native culture, but in this caseas a second first language.
III. By learning to understand another tradition, one discovers what is
untranslatable between the two. By learning why it is untranslatable,
one is enabled to find a viewpoint disengaged from oneself, yet not 'a
view from nowhere'. It is presumably from this 'disengaged view' that
one can begin to decide between competing traditions.
IV. A tradition partly32defeats another by providing the resources both to
explain why the other has collapsed into incoherence and to present
solutions to those incoherences(again acceptable to the inhabitants of
the defeated tradition on their own terms).
V. A tradition partly vindicates itself against others to the extent to which
it can provide the resourcesto deal with its own epistemological crises.
Imagine that MacIntyre puts forward these theses to Gadamer. Perhaps the
resulting 'dialogue' goes a little something like this:
On my first point, MacIntyre claims that a tradition facing epistemological
crisis falls into incoherenceon its own terms. Gadameragrees with this in the
sense that, when we understand well, we always do so initially from within
our own tradition (paradigm/horizon). This is a consequence of the
"hermeneutic circle" present at the birthplace of understanding. We can
understand other traditions, but only as initially integrated into our own
horizon. MacIntyre agrees with Gadamer's rehabilitation of prejudice and
tradition.
Gadamer (1975: 81-82) holds the Enlightenment responsible for both the
negative connotations of the notion of prejudice and the reluctance to take
recourse to the authority of tradition. For Gadamer, the Enlightenment sees
32 MacIntyre maintains that some 'core' common to both the victor and defeated must
remain. The revolution cannot result in a radical, "new" tradition.
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prejudice and tradition as the anti-thesis of reason and method" Gadamer's
rehabilitation of "prejudice" and "tradition" involves three steps, the first two
of which concern solely the former:
1. Gadamer adapts Husserl's insight that all understanding of an object is
understanding of that object as something. In other words, we project
meaning on an object that is not contained in perception itself.34
2. Gadamer follows Heidegger in arguing that interpretive projections of
meaning are rooted in the situation of the interpreter. For Heidegger, the
fore-structure of understanding is such that even before I consciously
begin to interpret an object, I have already placed it in a certain context
(Vorhabe), approached it from a certain perspective (Vorsichf) and
conceived of it in a certain way (Vorgriff). There is no neutral vantage
point from which to determine the 'real' meaning of an object. It's
meaning is determined by context or what Dilthey calls one's "life-
relations". (Gadamer, 1975: 232-240).
3. Points 1 and 2 raise the spectre of subjectivism, for is there any difference
between adequate understanding and personal prejudice? In response to
this Gadamer says that prejudice and tradition are not simply 'mine' or
33 According to Gadamer, from the perspective of the Enlightenment, prejudice arises from
two sources: firstly, from relying from traditional views and not using one's own reason and
secondly, from using reason over-hastily and unmethodically (Warnke, 1987: 75). Even
though in some (or even many) cases, tradition, prejudice and superstition can be seen as
the anti-thesis of reason, this does not negate, for Gadamer, their fundamentality in
understanding.
34 Consider Warnke's (1987: 75-76) example of a three-dimensional object. For Husserl, even
though I cannot see all sides at once, I still intend each side as a side and project the idea
that all sides are present although this cannot be based on perception alone. For Husserl, I
do not first have a sense experience and then interpret it in a certain way. Rather, I
anticipate the object's three-dimensionality in perceiving it. See Husserl's Logical
Investigations (especially investigation 1) and his Ideas: General introduction to Pure
Phenomenology (especially chapter 3). For Gadamer, the perception of an object involves
the intentional act of meaning giving. Perception is always prejudiced by a vantage point:
There is no doubt that seeing as an articulated reading of that which is there looks
away, as it were, from much that is there so that for sight it is simply no longer
there. Equally, however, it is also led by its anticipations to read in what is absolutely
not there .... Pure seeing and pure hearing are dogmatic abstractions that artificially
reduce the phenomenon. Perception includes meaning.
(Gada mer, 1975: 81-82)
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'yours' but belong to a historical tradition into which we are 'thrown'. The
standards by which we measureare not subjective, but inter-subjective.
To return to my first claim on MacIntyre's claims, MacIntyre seems right, in
the light of Gadamer, to claim that a tradition must understand and be
understood on its own terms. For Gadamer, tradition has a force over us that
in a sense cannot be escaped. We can reject it, but only on its own terms.
In reacting to or rejecting a tradition, we remain conditioned by it. Gadamer
calls this "effective history" or Wirkungsgeschichte.
On my second point, MacIntyre claims that another tradition can only be
engaged in dialogue by learning its language and culture. This is done by
learning that culture as a native child might, but in this case as a second first
language. MacIntyre's notion of learning a culture 'from the inside out' as a
"second first language" seemswholly dubious and counterfactual to Gadamer.
Even though Gadamer stressesthat one's situatedness does not prevent one
from understanding foreign traditions (in fact it is the precondition for such
understanding), he still disagrees with the extent to which MacIntyre
proposes to 'leave' one's tradition. Gadamer is somewhat more conservative
than MacIntyre when it comes to leaving the grip of one's tradition. Gadamer
asks why it is necessaryfor MacIntyre to refer to a "second language" as a
"second first language".35 For Gadamer's more conservative hermeneutics,
the former title is more appropriate when referring to the acquisition of a
'foreign'language. Gadamer'scriticism of MacIntyre suggests that MacIntyre
sometimes claims very strong normative force for tradition, most notably
when demanding that we reclaim the Aristotelian-Thomist moral tradition, and
sometimes claims weaker force, as in the possibility of escaping our tradition
by learning a "second first language". For Gadamer, MacIntyre embraces a
similar perspectivism, conservatism and subjectivism concerning the
35 Bear in mind, this "dialogue" is constructed by the author and bear's his opinions on
Gadamer, not Gadamer's.
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preconditions for understanding, but then stretches the possibility of leaving
one's prejudices too far.
This last point comes to the fore in my third point. One of MacIntyre's most
powerful and potentially controversial theses, as contained in "Relativism,
Power and Philosoph?", is that by discovering what is untranslatable from
one language into another and why, one is able to find a viewpoint
disengaged from oneself. Gadamer thinks that it is sensible for MacIntyre to
propose that this viewpoint is not a 'view from nowhere'." More importantly,
he surprisingly agrees with MacIntyre that one can attain a position that is
disengaged from oneself. For Gadamer, however, this position is the result of
the dialogic nature of understanding and the aspects of the truth that are
revealed in this understanding and not specifically the result of understanding
why untranslatability occurs.
When we understand, according to Gadamer,we do so from our own horizon.
The subjectivism in this is countered by engaging in dialogue with the other
by anticipating the potential truth of what the other is saying (the anticipation
of completeness). What results from the dialogue is that both parties are
given insight into aspectsof the truth. The "synthesis" of both initial positions
results in a "higher truth" than was contained in the initial positions. For
Gadamer (1975: 331):
What steps out in its truth is the Logos, which is neither mine nor
yours and which therefore so far supersedesthe subjective opinions of
the discussion partners that even the leader of the discussion always
remains the ignorant one.
Both Gadamer and MacIntyre thus hold onto the situatedness of truth and
understanding. Whilst both make an exceptional case for this, they still seem
36 See p 404.
37 To use one of Nagel's pet phrases.
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to be caught in the grips of the very thinking they want to forget - the
chimera of absolute truth or as Gadamercalls it, the "Logos'. I have already
taken MacIntyre to task for both relativising epistemology and claiming that
his view is simply right or the truth (even though he denies the 'absoluteness'
of this at times). Similarly, Habermastakes Gadamer to task for claiming to
get at the truth whilst holding onto a 'conservative' account of reason. For
Habermas,Gadamer'saccount of understanding does not adequately account
for the influence of ideology38. As such it lacks the resources to explain how
ideology is discoveredand overcome:
One could argue that too many women took the possible truth of this
consensus [Gadamer's dialogic conception of understanding] too
seriously for too long since it served to mask a hierarchical power
structure. In approaching traditional views of women hermeneutically,
in trying to make sense out of them on their own grounds and
incorporate their truth into their own lives, women did so at their own
expense.
(Warnke, 1987: 112)
My fourth point again concerns the problem of ideology. MacIntyre's claim is
that a tradition defeats another by providing the resources both to explain
why the other has collapsed into incoherence and to present solutions to
those incoherences (again acceptable to the inhabitants of the defeated
tradition on their own terms). Gadamer disagrees with MacIntyre that one
tradition defeats another per se. MacIntyre's use of 'victory' and 'defeat' too
closely mirrors the type of Enlightenment thinking that both thinkers want to
reject. For Gadamer, what results from the dialogic nature of understanding
is not merely the subjective or inter-subjective dogmatism of one's
38 However, Habermas's own attempt at creating "unconstrained communication" is not
unproblematic. Habermas constructs the "ideal speech situation" as a standard against which
Gadamer's consensus with tradition is to be measured. What Habermas aims at is a criterion
for determining when a traditional consensus is void of force and coercion. Habermas leaves
himself open for the criticism that such a situation is a fiction with its own history and
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conversation partner or the possible dogmatism involved of always accepting
authority on one's own terms, but it is the emergence of elements of the
Logos, the Truth. MacIntyre speaksof "victory", "defeat", "falsification" and
"truth", yet on the other hand eventually denies the possibility of absolute
truth. MacIntyre says that although universal claims can be made, they are
only such that they are the best standards that have emerged so far.
MacIntyre's thesis precluded the possibility of knowing for sure" one is right
and knowing for sure when one's base thinking is "systematically distorted".
Although this is problematic, I don't think MacIntyre would have it otherwise.
MacIntyre's main general problem is that without a "neutral" conception of
reason and truth, he cannot coherently make some of the claims he does."
My fifth point is that MacIntyre claims that a tradition partly vindicates itself
against others to the extent to which it can provide the resourcesto deal with
its own epistemological crises. MacIntyre says that in order for this to happen
a tradition must have vibrant and imaginative visionary thinkers like Aquinas.
For Gadamer, understanding is more inter-subjective and relies less on the
imaginative genius of individuals (although this may be a necessary element
of understanding). Understanding is spawned from dialogic partners, but if it
is to be true understanding, it supersedestheir initial insights and the sum of
their combined insights.
The second problem for MacIntyre is: "how does one know when one has a
true or real epistemological crisis?" This question is similar to the one that
Habermas asks Gadamer: "how does one know when one's understanding is
free of ideology?" Habermassays that Hermeneutics can work, but only if in
a context devoid of ideology and force. Albrecht Wellmer (1974: 47) agrees
with Habermaswhen he says:
circumstance. It seems unlikely that his equally lofty ideals can be maintained. For the
details of Habermas's "unconstrained communication" see Warnke (1987: 129-134).
39 It must be noted that there is no unproblematic way of stating the preconditions for truth,
as is testified to by, for example, Habermas's problematic "idealised speech situation" in
which rational participants can hammer out the truth free of significant prejudice and
ideological distortion.
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The Enlightenment knew what hermeneutics forgets - that the
dialogue which, according to Gadamer, we "are" is also a context of
power and preciselyfor this reason no dialogue.... The universal claim
of the hermeneutic approach [can only] be sustained if one assumes
that the context of the tradition as the locus of possible truth and
factual agreement is, at the same time, the locus of factual untruth
and continuing force.
Similarly, for MacIntyre, there is the concern that our epistemological crisis
may simply be our parochial crisis. The spectre of relativism raises its head
again. It is not clear that the problem of ideology can always be rooted out
of an epistemological crisis, as it may be partly constitutive of that crisis. As
Warnke says on the Gadamer/Habermas debate, which can be applied to
MacIntyre:
The crucial point here is that ideology is not the same as prejudice,
that there is a difference between calling a perspective ideological and
recognising its social and historical situatedness. What makes a claim
ideological is not merely its connection to an unarticulated source, or
its reliance on unexpressednorms and assumptions. Ideological claims
do not simply leave the assumptions behind them implicit; they rather
articulate them in such a way that it becomes difficult to disentangle
the warranted part of the claims from the unwarranted.
(Warnke, 1987: 115)
MacIntyre cannot coherently propose that a tradition will fall into a true
epistemological crisis, devoid of force and ideology. Similarly he cannot
propose that the resources it uses to resolve that crisis will be free of force
and ideology. While I agree with MacIntyre that any understanding must be
40 This is also Colby's (1995: 55) claim.
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situated, I find fault with the way in which he, like Gadamer, equates
"ideology" and "prejudice".
We have considered MacIntyre's preconditions for understanding. What
remains to expose is the ultimate goal behind MacIntyre's exposition of the
preconditions of understanding. The goal of understanding how traditions are
understood serves the goal of ultimately choosing between them and as
MacIntyre says in his ultimatum, choosewe must.
The preconditions for rationally choosing between traditions
MacIntyre says that even before the contemporary debate on practical
rationality is entered into, opponents of liberalism (as the inevitable result of
the Enlightenment Project) are forced into an antagonistic stance. Liberalism,
as MacIntyre understands it, appears in many guises in contemporary
debates. These guises enable it to reformulate quarrels against liberalism to
quarrels within liberalism. Everything is put into doubt, says MacIntyre,
except the very radical tenants of liberalism. The problem and quest for
opponents of liberalism (such as MacIntyre), is to create the institutional
space in which real debate can occur, debate that is not predisposed to
favour liberalism and debate that does not have a predetermined outcome.
These are the problems for the person MacIntyre primarily addresses Whose
Justice? Which Rationality?to. (WJWR: 392-393).
MacIntyre is primarily addressing the person who has not yet given his
allegiance to a particular coherent tradition of enquiry. Such a person is
confronted by the traditions exposed by MacIntyre as well as others. 'How is
it rational to respond to them, and how is it rational to choose between
them?' asks MacIntyre. MacIntyre's initial response to the claim a tradition
makeson us is to say that we respond depending on who we are and how we
understand ourselves. This constitutes, as we have seen, the "conservative"
and "subjectivist" part of Gadamer's hermeneutics of understanding. Many
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philosophers recoil from such a notion because they have by and large
presupposed
what in fact is not true, that there are standards of rationality,
adequate for the evaluation of rival answers to such questions, equally
available, at least in principle, to all persons, whatever tradition they
may happen to find themselves in and whether or not they inhabit any
tradition.
(WJWR:393)
MacIntyre says that the problems of practical rationality are, once we give up
the chimera of neutral rationality, not the same sets of problems for all
persons. What these problems are, how they are formulated and resolved
will differ according to social and historical circumstance. (WJWR:393).
How does it make sense for a person to occupy another tradition, according
to MacIntyre? He says that even though we cannot literally occupy other
traditions, we can do so by acts of empathetic conceptual imagination. This
enables one to enter into discourse with another tradition. Next, MacIntyre
floods the reader with another series of rants on how modernity makes
inadequate claims to the preconditions for rational choice. MacIntyre
criticises the pragmatist who reacts to the failure of the Enlightenment Project
by concluding that because there are no neutral standards of justification,
there is no rational way of choosing between traditions and that every
scheme of belief that goes beyond pragmatic necessity is equally unjustified.
Sucha person cannot belong to a community of discourse and therefore must
be disqualified from participating in such discourse." This type of relativism
is most prominent in the thought of the very proponents of extreme anti-
relativism who use the "internationalised languagesof modernity". MacIntyre
41 This is, I propose, the fate of Richard Rorty. Rorty untethers his writing from any
(recognisable) conception of "truth" but still wants to be taken seriously. He in effect renders
himself incapable of discourse.
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calls the last-mentioned the "alienated... languages of everywhere and of
nowhere" (WJWR:396).
MacIntyre continues on the warpath against modernity long into his
discussionon the preconditions for rationality and rationally choosing between
traditions. Those who only see tradition and schemes of belief as
characterised by arbitrary will are deprived of what tradition affords. This
view is for MacIntyre an impoverished one. To those who oppose tradition
and reason, MacIntyre says that
from an Aristotelian [point of view] they have refused to learn or have
been unable to learn that one cannot think for oneself if one thinks
entirely by oneself, that it is only by participation in rational practice-
basedcommunity that one becomesrational.42
(WJWR: 396)
MacIntyre notes that he is stereotyping the modern person to a large degree.
What is more common in contemporary life, says MacIntyre, is that people
live between traditions adapting fragments of many traditions. They live
"betwixt and between" traditions, accepting each only piecemeal. At this
point, MacIntyre implicitly43takes the reader back to the "modern muddle
concerning morality" as first exposed in After Virtue:
42 For MacIntyre, it is necessary to re-enter the Aristotelian-Thomist morality and rationality
schemes in order to restore and make coherent moral theory. MacIntyre asks himself
whether it is indeed at all possible to enter in a social scheme of belief that no longer exists.
He answers this question affirmatively. Even though such a scheme no longer exists in
practice,
This does not mean that one cannot be an Aristotelian without membership in an
actual polis, or that one cannot be a Humean outside the specifically hierarchically
ordered relationships of eighteenth-century England. Were this so, the study of
Aristotelian or Humean theory could only be of antiquarian interest. What this does
mean is that it is only insofar as those features of the polis which provide an essential
context for the exercise of Aristotelian justice and for the action-guiding and
interpretive uses of the Aristotelian schema of practical reasoning can be embodied in
one's own life and that of one's time and place that one can be an Aristotelian.
(WJWR: 391)
43 In the preface to Whose Justice? Which Rationality? MacIntyre states that his aim is that it
should be possible to read this book without any prior knowledge of After Virtue. The former
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This type of self has too many half-convictions and too few settled
coherent convictions, too many partly formulated alternatives and too
few opportunities to evaluate them systematically, brings to its
encounters with the claims of rival traditions a fundamental
incoherence which is too disturbing to be admitted to self-conscious
awareness except on the rarest of occasions. ...This type of
fragmentation appears in divided moral attitudes expressed in
inconsistent moral and political principles, in a tolerance of different
rationalities in different milieus, in protective compartmentalization of
the self, and in uses of language which move from fragments of one
language-in-use through the idioms of internationalized modernity to
fragments of another.
(WJWR: 397)
How, asks MacIntyre, does the above person enter into dialogue with other
traditions of enquiry? Such a person has to dialectically test the theses
proposed by competing traditions by testing them against the theses that one
brings to the encounter. One has to learn the idioms of each tradition in
order to 'translate' them into the idioms of the other traditions. One looks to
other traditions to better characterise and solve one's own inconsistencies. It
seems like for MacIntyre, one of the most important characteristics of a
mature tradition claiming legitimacy is the possibility of its negation or
falsification44:
book should, according to MacIntyre, be able to 'stand alone'. Any comparison between the
two thus contains my opinions.
44 MacIntyre himself never, to the best of my knowledge, uses these terms. They seem close
to Popper's definition of a scientific theory. According to Popper, a theory is only scientific in
that it can be falsified. This is to say that its protagoniSts must furnish the conditions under
which it can be considered false and rejected. For a more detailed analysis see Popper's
Conjectures and Refutations. An example of an unscientific theory is that of Freud's
psychoanalysis. The conditions under which such theories can be refuted are never given
and thus seem true whatever the circumstances.
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One of the marks of any mature tradition of rational enquiry is that it
possessesthe resources to furnish accounts of a range of conditions in
which incoherence would become inescapable and to explain how
these conditions would come about.
(WJWR:398)
The major point of most of MacIntyre's writings (and this is especially marked
in "Relativism, Power and Philosophy'') is that rational enquiry must begin
from particular circumstance and situatedness. This is what the modern
liberal culture forgets:
Abstract the particular theses to be debated and evaluated from their
contexts within traditions of enquiry and then attempt to debate and
evaluate them in terms of their rational justifiability to any rational
person, to individual as abstracted from their particularities of
character, history, and circumstance, and you will thereby make the
kind of rational dialogue which could move through argumentative
evaluation to the rational acceptance or rejection of a tradition of
enquiry effectively impossible.
(WJWR: 398-399)
This is why reason breaks down today. In the modern liberal university, says
MacIntyre, although we no longer believe in absolutely independent and
neutral rationality, we act as if this is the case (WJWR: 399). We are
committed to holding a "fictitious objectivity" where none exists. This has
harmed the natural sciencesmost of all, says MacIntyre, because they have
lost touch with the traditions that render them rational. The result of this is
that there is "an apparent [my emphasis] inconclusiveness in all argument
outside the natural sciences" (WJWR: 400). This can only be altered,
according to MacIntyre, by sufficiently subverting or circumventing the liberal
mode of thought so as to challenge its hegemony. Only then, says MacIntyre
(WJWR:401), will it be possible to speak in a way that will not always already
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involve conflict. Until this subversion of liberalism occurs, MacIntyre notes
that he is forced to justify the Aristotelian-Thomist position by presenting it as
antagonistic and superior to other traditions.
This is where, MacIntyre concludes in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, we
have to begin. To vindicate the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition in a culture of
institutional liberalised reason, MacIntyre has to exhibit how the former
contains resources for its own enlargement, correction and defense. He has
to also show that so far the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition has confirmed its
rationality in encounters with other traditions. What MacIntyre does not get
clear on, and this is one of the main elements of Colby's criticism, is that it
seems that MacIntyre justifies the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition to
Artistotelian-Thomists.45 This type of self-justifying relativism haunts Whose
Justice? Which Rationality?
At this stage, MacIntyre has shown us where rational enquiry into vindicating
the Aristotelian-Thomist moral tradition can start:
The rival claims to truth of contending traditions of enquiry depend for
their vindication upon the adequacy and the explanatory power of the
histories which the resources of each of those traditions in conflict
enable their adherents to write.
(WJWR:403)
The question we have been answering, "Is it coherent to argue for the re-
appropriation of an ancient moral tradition?" now can no longer be asked in
generality. Following MacIntyre, we must more closely examine the
coherence of his re-appropriation of tradition as specifically typified by the
Thomist tradition.
45 See the section on "The relativist challenge".
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3The rationality of the Aristotelian- Thomist tradition
Three rival versions of moral enquiry -Encyclopedia, Genealogy and
Tradition
The previous section concluded that MacIntyre's Whose Justice? Which
Rationality? ended at the point at which we must reform the first part of our
twofold question to MacIntyre. Given MacIntyre's preconditions for the
rational vindication of an ancient moral tradition, we must move from the
general question being asked, "Is it coherent to argue for the appropriation of
an ancient moral tradition?" to a more specific question. MacIntyre realises
that the time has come to stop speaking in generalities. The argumentation
necessary to vindicate his re-appropriation of the Aristotelian-Thomist moral
scheme must be located, so MacIntyre finds, within the historical rivalry
contained in what he proposesto be the three rival versions of moral enquiry,
namely Encyclopedia,Genealogyand Tradition.
MacIntyre only wants to argue that the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition is the
most coherent position on moral theory explicated thus far. As such it must
be vindicated against its rivals. The "truth" of the Aristotelian-Thomist
tradition can only be demonstrated by showing its superiority to other
schemes.
For MacIntyre, "neutral rationality" is a myth. Rather, there are different
rationalities contained within incommensurabletraditions (traditions that have
no common measure). The charge that MacIntyre faces is the charge,
particularly from the Genealogist, that because neutral rationality is a myth,
there is no way of justifying one incommensurable framework over another.
MacIntyre maintains that one can rationally choose between
incommensurable (moral) frameworks.
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According to Fuller (1998: 28), MacIntyre uses the same method of testing
moral schemes that Paul Feyerabend applies to incommensurable scientific
frameworks in the latter's Against Method. Fuller says that Feyerabend
argues that one cannot test incommensurabletheories directly. This is to say
one cannot test them against the world as it stands or against each other
without running into problems of circularity. However, Feyerabend says that
one can test incommensurabletheories indirectly.
There is only one task that we can legitimately demand of a theory,
and it is that it should give us a correct account of the world, i.e., of
the totality of facts as constituted by its own basic concepts ... is it not
reasonable to assume that a point of view, such as the point of view of
classical mechanics, that has been found wanting in various respects
and that gets into difficulty with its own facts ... cannot have entirely
adequate concepts? Is it not equally reasonable to try to replace its
concepts with a more successful cosmology? ... Incommensurable
theories, then, can be refuted by reference to their own respective
kinds of experience, i.e., by discovering the internal contradictions
from which they are suffering ... [But] their contents cannot be
[directly] compared.
(Feyerabend, 1975: 248)
Fuller (1998: 28-29) finds this method similar to the ancient procedure of
argument, reductio ad absurdum. This procedure entails showing that one's
opponent's position is inconsistent and problematic on its own terms, whilst
showing that one's own position is free from inconsistencies.
In arguing for the re-appropriation of the Aristotelian-Thomist moral scheme,
and later for the re-appropriation more specifically of Thomism in Three Riva/
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Versions of Moral EnquirY, MacIntyre implicitly asks himself the question, "Is
Thomism the most coherent moral position achieved thus far in moral
theorising?" This question has two inter-related components regarding
MacIntyre's procedure, which form the backbone of Three Rival Versions of
Moral Enquiry:
• MacIntyre attempts to prove the greater coherence of Thomism over
Encyclopediaand Genealogy.
• MacIntyre likewise hopes to prove the incoherence of Encyclopaediaand
Genealogy(Fuller, 1998:29).
How are these two components to be proved? In the former case, MacIntyre
says that:
Is there any way that one of these rivals might prevail over the others?
One possible answer was supplied by Dante: that narrative prevails
over its rivals which is able to include its rivals within it, not only to
retell their stories as episodes within its story, but to tell the story of
the telling of their stories as such episodes.
(TRVME:80-81)
In the latter case, to pre-empt the sections on Genealogyand Encyclopaedia,
MacIntyre says:
So we also need to proceed by raising critical questions for
encyclopaedistsand genealogists, not on our own terms, but in theirs
... Just such a problem is raised for the genealogist, I shall suggest, by
his or her conception of personal identity. And in the encyclopaedist's
idiom no expression invites such questions more obviously than
'morality'itself.
1 For MacIntyre, Thomism now represents the highest, most coherent moral scheme achieved
thus far. While Aristotle is the hero of After Virtue, Aquinas takes over at the helm in Whose
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(Madntyre, 1991: 173)
The project ahead of MacIntyre to vindicate Thomist moral theorising seems
to be a thorny, stony road that twists towards an ever-receding horizon.
There is no way of definitively, a la Enlightenment thinking, vindicating
Thomism once and for all. This is not the purpose of Three Rival Versions of
Moral Enquiry. Its purpose is, says MacIntyre, to be part of a greater struggle
in progress between rivals (TRVME:215). This conflict is not terminated nor
should it be thought of as ultimately terminable in the 'Enlightenment' sense
of the possibility of finding the solution to end all problems. MacIntyre
sensibly leaves the possibility of the falsification of his theory that Thomism is
the most coherent moral theory when he says that:
It is of course possible that genealogy can discover within itself, or at
least from sourcesnot alien to it, the resources to provide a solution to
[its] problems ... It is therefore the case that in the tripartite hostilities
between the heirs of the encyclopedia, post-Nietzschean genealogy,
and Thomistic tradition neither argument nor conflict is yet terminate.
These are struggles in progress, defining in key part the contemporary
cultural milieu by the progress of their dissensions.... To contribute to
writing the history of these unfinished debates is also inevitably to
participate in them.
(TRVME:215)
MacIntyre makes the concessionthat his three rival versions of moral enquiry
are parochial to his own thought. He tells us in, Whose Justice? Which
Rationality? (10-11), that his exposition does not cover the options of
Judaism, the Prussiantradition and Islam:
There are other bodies of tradition-constituted enquiry which not only
merit attention in their own right but whose omission will leave my
Justice? Which Rationality? and Three rival Versions of Moral Enquiry.
60
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
argument significantly incomplete is undeniable ... Judaism, within the
relationship of the devoted study of the Torah to philosophy
engendered more than one tradition of enquiry ... The whole Prussian
tradition in which public law and Lutheran theology were blended, a
tradition which Kant, Fichte, and Hegel tried but failed to universalize
... Islamic thought requires treatment ... also the narratives of such
sharply contrasting traditions of enquiry as those engendered in India
and China.
Yet is it necessaryfor MacIntyre to cover all options? Yes, in the sense that it
will make his narrative more complete, more coherent. No, in the sense that
he purports that is impossible to get "the answer" by covering all options.
Where MacIntyre will find himself in hot water is that he claims in After
Virtue, following his stark ultimatum, that one must simply follow Aristotle
over Nietzsche, that there is no other option. This is further explicated in
chapter 4.
MacIntyre's moral task turns out to be a mammoth one. From its humble
beginnings in A short history of Ethics, it becomes a raging torrent that
increasingly seems to take on a life of its own. MacIntyre realises this when
he jokes that he is involved in "a project described by one of my colleagues
as that of writing an interminably long history of Ethicsf.!]" (MacIntyre, 1991:
63).
Let us begin then on the twisty path that MacIntyre lays before us. Following
MacIntyre's account of rationality, one must first be initiated into a tradition in
order to see its (possible) rationality in retrospect. Let us enter into the
scheme that MacIntyre advocates- in order to critically evaluate- the
rationality of the Thomist tradition. The first necessary step in this direction
must be to get clear in our minds precisely what MacIntyre means by
"Encyclopaedia", "Genealogy" and "Tradition".
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Encyclopaedia is that mode of moral enquiry that directly represents the
ideals of the Enlightenment. As such it is, at least since After Virtue,
MacIntyre's chief bugbear. What then is the Enlightenment? The
Enlightenment represents the culmination of the growth of modern science
and the belief that it is through the powers of reason, especially scientific
reason, that we get at what is really out there. It represents the movement
from mythos to logos, from darkness and dogma to reason and
enlightenment. There are three main and linked principles at the heart of the
Enlightenment:
1) Through the powers of reason, and especially scientific reason,
humanity will be able to penetrate to the ultimate truth about
reality and society. The rational order of the human mind is
capable of reflecting the rational order of the universe and of
reorganizing society along more rational lines.
2) Through the dedicated and impartial use of such reason, all human
beings (or, indeed, all rational beings) will be able to achieve
agreement or consensusabout the truth, since everyone shares the
same rationality.
3) What chiefly prevents such consensual rational agreement about
the truth are a number of Baconian-styleidols: superstition, dogma,
bigotry, prejudice, custom, tradition, habit, delusive hopes and
fears. All these function as blemisheson the clear mirror of reason,
cobwebs which cloud the view and which need wiping away in
order to see the truth clearly. They need to be expunged from
rational enquiry.
(Fuller, 1998: 14-15)
For MacIntyre, Encyclopaedia represents a specific type of "reason" and a
correspondingly specific version of moral enquiry that is inspired by the
Enlightenment:
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The encyclopaedist's conception is of a single framework within which
knowledge is discriminated from mere belief, progress towards
knowledge is mapped, and the truth is understood as the relationship
of our knowledge to the world, through the application of those
methods whose rules are the rules of rationality as such. """
Correspondingly in ethics there is on the encyclopaedist's view a set of
conceptions of duty, obligation, the right, and the good which have
emerged from and can be shown to be superior to - in respect both of
title to rational justification and of what is taken to be genuinely moral
conduct - their primitive, ancient, and other pre-Enlightenment
predecessors.
(TRVME:42)
For MacIntyre, "encyclopaedia" means a belief in a universally shared
rationality that can progress towards truth in all spheres of life including
ethics and epistemology (knowledge about knowledge). For MacIntyre, this
belief is typically characterised by the Ninth Edition of the Encyclopaedia
Britannica (TRVME:24).
It is against this conception of reason that MacIntyre's philosophy holds the
greatest beef. MacIntyre seems to hold Genealogy in greater esteem than
Encyclopaedia in that the former's job is fundamentally that of 'unmasking'
the other - showing its pretensions and mcoherence.' Genealogy, for
MacIntyre, represents the attempt to undermine Encyclopaedia. The latter
results directly from the "Enlightenment Project", while the latter is
inextricably embedded in the former. Genealogy is parasitic on the
"Enlightenment Project" in that it is a reaction against it.
Genealogy for MacIntyre is typified by Nietzsche'sZur Genealogie der Moral,
published in 1887. MacIntyre says that while the Encyclopaedist tries to
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replace the Bible as the canonical book, the genealogist tries to discredit the
very notion of a canon. (TRVME:25).
According to Fuller, the history of genealogy can be traced back to its
beginnings in Hume's attacks on the Enlightenment notion that reason can
reveal the truth about reality without recourse to the "idols" of "tradition" and
"prejudice". MacIntyre's criticism of "pure reason" is a contemporary type of
Hume's original position. MacIntyre's basic criticism of the Enlightenment
Project pervades his work and is colourfully summarisd thus by Fuller (1998:
17-18):
The fundamental problem, then, is that the premises of rational
arguments can only be derived from outside reason (understood as
obedience to the laws of logic) itself. The premises can only come
from experience as it is filtered through such things as prejudice and
tradition. Ironically, the unwanted lackeys that Enlightenment had
ordered out of the front door of the house of reason - Tradition and
Prejudice - are now seen by MacIntyre to have sneaked in again by
the back door and to have commanded the central place by the hearth.
Or to make the metaphor more accurate, Tradition and prejudice had
in fact never gone away. It was merely that the Enlightenment was
too short-sighted to see them.
MacIntyre's criticisms it seems are at the contemporary end of a history that
proceeds from Hume to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, to Hegel (and two
contemporary philosophers who directly build on Kant, C.S. Pierce and Karl
Popper), to Schopenhauer, finally culminating in Nietzsche.3 Nietzsche
confronts the "three Enlightenment ideals" head-on:
2 The irony concerning the Genealogical stance here is that it tries to unmask the "untruth" of
Enlightenment pretensions by using the Enlightenment ideals - the very ideals it purports to
reject- of getting at what is really out there, at what is really going on.
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1. Reasoncannot reveal to us the truth about reality
2. There is no consensusin reason
3. Such things as prejudice, tradition, custom, habit, delusive hopes
and fears lie at the very heart of reason, inspiring it to adopt
numerous different strategies and perspectives, "lying fictions"
which only ever interpret the world, never uncovering any original
text. (Fuller, 1998: 21).
MacIntyre sees Nietzsche'sthought, particularly Zur Genealogie der Moral, as
a prototype of Genealogy. MacIntyre defines Genealogythus:
Nietzsche, as a genealogist, takes there to be a multiplicity of
perspectives within each of which truth-from-a-point-of-view may be
asserted, but no truth-as-such, an empty notion, about the world, an
equally empty notion. There are no rules of rationality as such to be
appealed to, there are rather strategies of insight and strategies of
subversion.
(TRVME:42)
We have already seen how MacIntyre applauds Nietzsche for unmasking the
pretensions of the Enlightenment Project and its corresponding claims
regarding moral theory. In After Virtue, MacIntyre regards Nietzsche to be
the moral philosopher, whilst condemning his ranting and ravings on what
morality should become after his genealogical 'unmasking'. To recap, where
MacIntyre departs from Nietzsche is that the latter says that because that
there is no neutral objectivity, no one moral perspective is any more
justifiable than any other is. Nietzsche would certainly call MacIntyre's
nostalgic longing to revive Thomism in moral theory as an inauthentic and
hypocritical attempt to ensure the tyranny of slave-morality over master-
morality. Nietzschewould clearly call MacIntyre's preaching about the Virtues
3 For a summary of the position achieved by each of these thinkers and how later thinkers
build on their ideas see Fuller (1998: 19-21).
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a sick, deprived attempt to tether the greatness of the Ubermensch!
MacIntyre makesan explicit retort to what he considers to be a 'sick soul' and
trades blowswith Nietzschethus:
The answer is: with what Aquinas says about the roots of intellectual
blindness in moral error, with the misdirection of the intellect by the
will and with the corruption of the will by the sin of pride, both that
pride which is an inordinate desire to be superior and that pride which
is an inclination to contempt for God. Where Nietzsche saw the
individual will as a fiction, as part of a mistaken psychology which
conceals from view the impersonal will to power, the Thomist can
elaborate out of the Materials found in the Summa an account of the
will to power as an intellectual fiction disguising the corruption of the
will. The activity of unmasking is itself to be understood from the
Thomist standpoint as a mask for pride.
(MacIntyre, 1991: 147)
This brings us to exposing our third concept, MacIntyre's use of "Tradition".
For MacIntyre, the "charter document" of "Tradition" is the encyclical letter
Aeterni Patris published by Pope Leo XIII in 1876, four years after the Ninth
Edition commenced publication. This encyclical letter advocates Aquinas as
having the resources to radically criticise the conception of rationality
dominant in the nineteenth century. It also advocates Aquinas's ability to
preserve and justify the canonical status of the Bible as distinct from, yet
hegemonicover, all secular enquiry. (TRVME:25). In Three Rival Versions of
Moral Enquiry, "Tradition" is best equated with the "Aristotelian-Thomist
Tradition" or the "Thomist Tradition" where Aquinas amends Aristotelian
moral theory to the highest point achieved thus far.
What then do "Aristotelianism" and "Thomism" mean? This question is
pertinent because MacIntyre does not advocate all that both these thinkers
propose. In After Virtue, for example, MacIntyre claims that Aristotle is
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'simply wrong' (to use my own words) with regard to his disregard for women
and slaves. Here, MacIntyre seems to forego "Tradition" and take recourse to
"Enlightenment ideals". Fuller (1998: 23-26) analyses MacIntyre's use of
"Aristotelianism" and "Thomism" by suggesting four possible interpretations:
1) A maximum interpretation, according to which MacIntyre accepts as
true everything that Aristotle and Aquinas say.
This is nonsensical because of MacIntyre's explicit distancing from Aristotle's
comments on slaves, women and productive labourers. Similarly, Fuller
doubts whether MacIntyre advocates much of what Aquinas says about
angels and what both thinkers say about physics and the natural sciences.
Such dismissals can only, following MacIntyre himself, detract from the overall
coherence of such schemes.
2) A minimum interpretation, according to which all MacIntyre wants
to re-appropriate, is a generic form of "human flourishing" and the
"common good".
Again, this is nonsensical in that even if liberalism cannot provide such ideals,
there are many encyclopaedic theories that do, namely Rousseau's General
Will theory, the Hegelian doctrine of the state, Marxism and Socialism.
3) An interpretation whereby MacIntyre thinks that Aquinas provides a
definitive set of moral first principles which need only be applied to
modern circumstance.
This is false in the sense that MacIntyre denies that any principles are beyond
retutetion" It is true in the sense that Aquinas gives us the best (most
coherent) moral account achieved thus far (TRVME: 142).
4 One wonders how MacIntyre can maintain this claim whilst believing that some of the first
principles in the Bible are fundamental and beyond refutation and falsification. What
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4) An interpretation whereby MacIntyre holds that Aquinas's first
principlesare open to revision and improvement.
This is true in the sense that just as Aristotle was improved upon so Aquinas
too can be improved upon. It is not only that Aquinas's principles should be
applied to contemporary contexts, but that it is a matter of modifying those
principles themselves.
The crucial point here that Fuller fails to mention is MacIntyre is ambiguous
with regard to whether canonical first-principles, such as given by Aquinas
and the Bible are open to radical refutation and questioning. On the one
hand, MacIntyre says that aI/theories should be open to refutation, yet in his
faith he holds that first-principles cannot be open to refutation- they are given
to us in faith. Surely, the idea that there are fundamental first-principles
represents precisely what the "Enlightenment Project" holds dear- principles
that are bedrock knowledge, knowledge that is absolute. MacIntyre might be
able to set the muddle straight if he clearly separates the modes of rational
(empirical) justification applicable to knowledge and epistemology and the
mode of justification appropriate to faith. Faith has to fall outside of
MacIntyre's somewhat 'scientific' conception of rationality in that, for
example, the conditions under which the existence of God may be disproved
cannot be stipulated.
Fuller makes a different point regarding interpretation 4). He says MacIntyre
makesThomism, as a tradition or "Tradition", too "open-ended" and "fuzzy"
when he (MacIntyre) makes first principles always open to "continuing
elaboration and reformulation". This "fuzziness" definitely counts against the
coherenceof MacIntyre's project:
MacIntyre fails to distinguish here is the difference between knowledge based on faith (faith)
and knowledge based on empirical observation and the methods of justification appropriate
68
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Let us be as clear as possible about the general nature of that project:
it is to argue for the greater coherenceof Thomism (as the culmination
of the Aristotelian tradition) compared to Encyclopaedia and
Genealogy. But since the rival frameworks of Encyclopaedia and
Genealogy are themselves presumably traditions of "continuing
elaboration and reformulation", it seems that we are in danger of
ending up in the awkward position that one inevitably open-ended and
fuzzy position is trying to argue for its superiority over two other open-
ended and fuzzy positions. In other words, it is no longer clear what
exactly is being argued against what, since the content of each of the
three positions, looked at over the long term, becomes vague and
vacuous.
(Fuller, 1998: 26)
Fuller does make one concession to MacIntyre concerning the above
argument. MacIntyre's project can be seen as more intelligible if we keep in
mind the "modest enterprise" that he is attempting, namely doing the best he
can with the resources he has so far. It seems MacIntyre will never escape
this type of relativism, nor would he have it otherwise. Just before we are
too harsh on MacIntyre, Fuller reminds us of the words of J.M. Keynes, "In
the long run, we are all dead" (Fuller, 1998: 26). The problem with the type
of relativism espoused by MacIntyre is that it renders incoherent any of his
claims that too closely resemble the "Enlightenment Project's" conceptions of
"truth", "reason" and "rationality". MacIntyre acknowledges, in After Virtue,
that his stance is at once on the back foot in that it is "quixotic" and exists in
the social and conceptual realm of the 'enemy', namely Liberalism and its
Enlightenment ideals.
Let us not, however, condemn MacIntyre before considering his arguments
for Tradition and his arguments against Encyclopaediaand Genealogy. It is
after all only fair that we interrogate him on his own terms. It is on his own
to both.
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terms that MacIntyre insists that we must enter into a 'foreign' tradition on its
own terms.
Tradition versus Encyclopaedia
MacIntyre's arguments against Encyclopaediapervade his work throughout.
As such they are difficult to pinpoint and summarise. They extend back to at
least After Virtue and are later made explicit in part in chapter VIII of Three
Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. MacIntyre's main point in the latter work is
contained in the chapter title, namely that the superstition of modernity is
that it claims"enlightened morality" (TRVME:170).
The Encyclopaedic stance claims that moral theory is a case of finding
universal timeless maxims that are accessible in theory to every rational
person. This type of thinking still pervades modern academia and needs to
be exorcised (TRVME:171). We still behave as if there is general agreement
on the academic project of the Ninth Edition. That such agreement is lacking
is clearly exposed to us in After Virtue's "modern muddle concerning
morality". This muddle is, to recap, that we have inherited a set of classical
virtues at odds with contemporary theories of the self and at odds with
contemporary views on scienceand rationality.
Linked to this is the faulty belief, says MacIntyre, that there is there is total
conceptual commensurability in practice. This belief means that we, rational
beings, can understand any claim to truth and any foreign culture no matter
how foreign they are to us. This results in, in my opinion, a homogenising
effect: we discover that they behavejust like we do.
MacIntyre's arguments for partial incommensurability and against total
commensurability are directed chiefly at Donald Davidson's work." For
5 For the original argument see WJWR chapter 19. For commentary on the debate between
MacIntyre and Davidson see Fuller (1998: 75-116). See also RPP for a practical example of
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Davidson, in practice, we can understand any 'foreign' culture. Davidson thus
has a "strong" conception of rationality.6 MacIntyre opts for a "weaker"
notion of rationality. For MacIntyre, Davidson suffers from remnants of the
Ninth Edition when he sayson the latter:
What would be required, on this contemporary view, for a conclusive
termination of rational debate would be an appeal to a standard or set
of standards such that no adequately rational person could fail to
acknowledge its authority. But such a standard or standards, since it
would have to provide criteria for the rational acceptability or otherwise
of any theoretical or conceptual scheme. But ... there can be no such
standard; any standard adequate to discharge such functions will be
embedded in, supported by, and articulated in terms of some set of
theoretical and conceptual structures.
(TRVME:172)
What Encyclopaedia forgets, according to MacIntyre, is its own historical
situatedness. The attempt to find timeless universal reason is not inherently
"rational" in MacIntyre's use of word. On dismissing universal timeless
reason, Genealogists and MacIntyre agree. Where Genealogy goes wrong
according to MacIntyre is that it supposes that because reason is not
timeless, there is no rational way of deciding between traditions and
paradigms.
It is only because of the Encyclopaedist's emphasis on universal, timeless
reason that he needs to seek timeless moral rules that apply to "men-as-
such", man deprived from the social context that he is bound up in.
MacIntyre sensibly maintains the social situatedness of man, his life and his
values and that the attempt to discover timeless universality is itself historical
and situated, when he says in After Virtue:
the effects incommensurability can have on a person who inhabits the "borderline situation"
in which one has lingual allegiance to two radically different cultures and sets of beliefs.
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The story of my life is always embedded in the story of those
communities from which I derive my identity ... The fact that the self
has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in
communities such as those of the family, the neighbourhood, the city
and the tribe does not entail that the self has to accept the moral
limitations of the particularities of those forms of community. Without
those moral particularities to begin from there would never be
anywhere to begin [my emphasis]; but it is in moving forward from
such particularity that the search for the good, for the universal
consists. Yet particularity can never be simply left behind or
obliterated. The notion of escaping from it into a realm of entirely
universal maxims which belong to man as such, whether in its
eighteenth century Kantian form or in the presentation of some
modern analytical philosophies, is an illusion with dangerous
consequences. When men and women identify what are in fact their
partial and particular causes too easily and too completely with the
causeof some universal principle, they usually behaveworse than they
would otherwise do.
(AV: 221)
And again in a 1991 interview:
[There is] pretension involved in the unwitting elevation of the
culturally and morally particular to the status of what is rationally
universal. So, for example, the name of that cultural artefact of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 'the individual', whose social
and moral relationships were held to be merely contingent and
incidental to his rational being and who has within himself... the
resources to criticize those relationships in the name of rights or utility,
6 See Davidson's article "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme".
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was systematically confused with human nature as such. 'Man', wrote
Nietzsche,'does not pursue happiness;only the Englishmandoes that'.
(Madntyre, 1991: 190)
Madntyre is particularly hard on Encyclopaediaas representing the ideals of
the "Enlightenment Project". In After Virtué, MacIntyre says that the latter
had to fail (specifically with regard to justifying moralit'/) given its own
incoherent project. In Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, MacIntyre
makes the same claim for the failure of Encyclopaediaas typified by the Ninth
Edition:
Judged by its own standards and in its own terms, the project of the
major contributors of the Ninth Edition failed; and in the failure of
those contributors and their readers to break out of their own self-
protective academic rhetoric in a way that would have enabled them to
perceive the emerging defects of their enterprise, they failed twice
over [!]
(TRVME:189)
Where MacIntyre's criticism of Encyclopaediaends, namely where the notion
of universal, timeless reason is thoroughly discredited, is where his criticism
of Genealogy begins. Where the genealogist sees this point as the stage at
which one cannot rationally decide between paradigms, MacIntyre holds that
this is precisely the stage at which one can start to vindicate paradigms. In
my opinion, and here I agree with Fuller (1998: 30), MacIntyre quite
successfully shows fundamental incoherences in the Encyclopaedic stance.
His criticisms on Genealogy, I propose, are not as comprehensive and hard-
hitting. This is perhaps becausehe favours the way in which Genealogy,and
Nietzsche in particular, 'unmasks' and ridicules the pretensions of
Encyclopaediaand the "Enlightenment Project" in general. Nietzsche is after
7 AV chapter 5
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all (presumably barring MacIntyre himself!) the moral philosopher for
MacIntyre.s
Tradition versus Genealogy
MacIntyre's first criticism of Genealogy concerns its incoherent use of identity
- personal, intellectual and moral. Concerning identity, Genealogists typically
do one of two things, according to Fuller (1998: 31):
1. They commit a fallacy similar to that of the Encyclopaedist. They believe
they can stand as individuals outside of the identities provided by tradition
and community and that they can, as a result, play with, mix and discard
traditions at will.
2. They alternatively regard identity as a perspectival mask that they can don
and later discard. As such, they ignore their social situatedness and
create the identity they want to assume at any given time.
In either case, the problem for the Genealogist is that, for MacIntyre, they do
not have a sufficient sense of personal continuity to carry through with their
project. I assume that Fuller is referring chiefly to Foucault in the first point
and Nietzsche in the latter.
MacIntyre's beef with Foucault" restates a well-known criticism on the latter.
In L 'Archeologie du Savoir (The Archaeology of Knowledge), Foucault makes
the individual a function of the nature of the discourse rather than vice versa
(TRVME: 206). In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison and more
specifically in, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, Foucault
creates an all-encompassing monster called "bio-power" which creates the
subject. The problem is that he in essence dissolves the subject, as we know
it, but still wants us to reason and deal with the phenomenon. The question
8 AV: 108
9 See TRVME: 206-208
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to ask to Foucault is twofold: "who is this "us" (since the subject no longer
exists)" and "why bother to understand or 'fight' against "bio-power" or do
anything for that matter?" Foucault'sproblem is twofold: his genealogy lacks
the conceptual resources to formulate the problems he generates, let alone
deal with the problems themselves. A self-reflexive criticism does many
harms to the coherence of Foucault's work and is one type of criticism that
Genealogyoften does not stand up well to."
More generally, MacIntyre puts his own criticisms of Foucault'scontinuation of
the Nietzscheanproject thus:
Yet now the question arises as to whether even Foucault's partial
implementation of the program may not have revealed that the
successivestrategies of the genealogist may not inescapably after all
involve him or her in commitments to standards at odds with the
central thesis of the genealogical stance. For in making his or her
sequenceof strategies and unmasking intelligible to him or herself, the
genealogist has to ascribe to the genealogical self a continuity of
deliberate purpose and a commitment to that purpose which can only
be ascribed to a self not to be dissolved into masks and moments, a
self which cannot be conceived as more and other than its disguises
and concealments and negotiations, a self which just insofar as it can
adopt alternative perspectives is itself not perspectival, but persistent
and substantial. Make of the genealogists' self nothing but what
genealogy makes of it, and that self is dissolved to the point at which
there is no longer a continuous genealogical project.
(TRVME: 54)
Another of MacIntyre's criticisms on Genealogy is again well known. It is
simply that the Genealogist has to use that traditional discourse of logic and
IOForan excellent critical interpretation of Foucault's treatment of the self see Dreyfus and
Rabinow's book, Michel Foucault Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, especially chapter
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metaphysics that he wants to repudiate. Logic is simply a mask that the
Genealogist temporarily wears and then discards. As such, says MacIntyre,
there is no victory for the genealogist that is not temporary. (TRVME:206).
The problem with this criticism is that it can be applied to MacIntyre with
good effect. In the Preface of After Virtue, MacIntyre himself takes on the
role of Genealogist in the sense of trying to unearth the "modern muddle
concerning morality" that the common man cannot recognise. MacIntyre
himself admits that he is 'always on the back foot' and in antagonistic stance
to the contemporary mode of parlance- liberal, "Enlightenment" individualism.
Why does MacIntyre find it a problem that the genealogist's victory is
temporary? MacIntyre's own claim is that the victory of Thomism (assuming
its coherence and the incoherence of its rivals) is temporary- it is the best
claim so far. The possibility of its future falsification (in terms of its
(in)coherence) must be left open. Nietzschewould certainly, I propose, see
MacIntyre's reclaiming of the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition in moral theory as
a fiction and a maskdonned by MacIntyre.
Finally, for MacIntyre, the genealogist is caught up in a self-referential
paradox concerning "truth" (Fuller, 1998: 32). Those who, in the Nietzschean
tradition, abandon "truth" seem to fall into incoherence. They often walk the
precarious tightrope of disowning "truth" as we Westerners know it (as some
type of correspondence to reality), but still want to be taken seriously. The
question is, "why should we take such persons seriously?" and what could
"seriously" entail?
RichardRorty is a good example of a thinker who discards "truth" as we know
it or alternatively, proposesa conception of truth that is so alien to "us" that
we cannot make sense of it. By untethering himself from "truth", Rorty in
effect makes himself incapable of argumentation (or perhaps better,
incapable of being taken seriousl'/) or alternatively, sometimes gets caught
8.
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out unwittingly using the traditional notion of "truth" that he refers to as a
"chimera".
Tradition vindicated?
MacIntyre's twofold criteria for the vindication of Tradition/Thomism, we have
seen, is that it must be coherent on its own terms and that it must be more
coherent than Encyclopaediaand Genealogy. To conclude this chapter, we
must then (on MacIntyre's own terms) ask two questions:
1. Is Thomism coherent?
2. Is Thomism more coherent than Encyclopaediaand Genealogy?
On the first question, MacIntyre's entire works are pervaded by evidence for
the comprehensivenessof Thomism in providing a rich account of moral life.
His chief argument is that the Thomist tradition represents the pinnacle of
achievement in moral theory. Every subsequent theory is a degeneration of
the greatness achieved by Aquinas.
In my opinion, MacIntyre's claim that Thomism is coherent is quite plausible.
There is always the worry that moral positions may always lead to
incoherenceand contradictions or that Emotivismmay in fact be true because
it is a fact of life. MacIntyre cannot remove the first worry altogether
(definitively) and would not want to- his moral quest is more modest than
this. It seems likely that recourse to a teleological scheme will restore
consensusto moral theory, but the question remains is whether this is what
we moral theorists want or should want. On the latter worry, MacIntyre
convincingly shows how Emotivism arises. Yet why does MacIntyre want to
restore order and rationality to ethics? Is this not to fulfill the Enlightenment
ideal of gaining such order and rational consensus? MacIntyre seems to
reject Enlightenment idealswhen it suits him to do so and rejects them when
it suits him to do so. Is this really the way that one want's to defend his
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nostalgic longings for antiquity? What MacIntyre forgets at crucial times in
his argumentation is the very social situatedness that he chides other
philosophers for ignoring- he forgets that he always has, following Gadamer's
preconditions for understanding, one foot in the "Enlightenment Project"!
If MacIntyre can clear up the incoherence in his position on Thomism that I
have noted and any incoherencewithin Thomism itself (a specific treatment
of Thomism falls outside the scope of this thesis), then Thomism can well be
shown to be coherent. The problem of relativism concerning the justification
of any scheme is also a problem that MacIntyre never effectively resolves.
MacIntyre's account of Aquinas (and the preconditions for rational justification
in general) is question-begging in that if it is found to be faulty, MacIntyre
thinks that he can simply say that it is in need of amendment on its own
terms. How then, can Aquinas really be refuted if MacIntyre fundamentally
believes in him? It seems unlikely that MacIntyre would really
(fundamentally/radically) turn on Aquinasor the Bible for that matter.
On the second question, "Is Thomism more coherent than Encyclopaediaand
Genealogy?" MacIntyre gives telling criticisms on the former in particular. It
is quite possible that one can answer the second question affirmatively. The
problem here is the nature and status of MacIntyre's claim of "greater
coherency". The problem of relativism raises its head again here. MacIntyre
does not adequately deal with the conservative nature of his enquiry. If
Thomism is only "more coherent" than (relative to) two less coherent
schemes, is there not always the possibility that this will always be the case
for the Thomisf?l1 Again, MacIntyre proposes that the partial falsification of
Thomism is possible in theory by surely denies this possibility by his practice.
MacIntyre also does not make enough of the implications of his admittance of
leaving out of traditions other than the abovementioned, namely, Judaism,
Il Colby (1995: 60) also makes this point.
78
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
the "Prussian tradition", Islam, India and China.I2 MacIntyre theoretically
accepts the possibility that one of them is more coherent than Thomism, yet
chooses,perhaps becauseof his smug belief that Thomism is better than rival
schemes, to ignore them as an ostrich buries its head in the sand in order to
escapea predator. MacIntyre can only say that he has dealt with Genealogy
and Encyclopaedia because of his tradition/education/upbringing (and he
would not have this otherwise), but yet claims so much normative force for
Thomism. This inconsistency reaches 'fever pitch' in the next chapter,
chapter 4. Here MacIntyre simply (incoherently) demands that we take
recourse to the Aristotelian-Thomist Moral Tradltlon'". Why does he make
this demand in After Virtue when he says in, Three Rival Versionsof Moral
Enquiry, that
It is therefore the case that in the tripartite hostilities between the
heirs of Encyclopaedia, post-Nietzschean genealogy, and Thomistic
tradition neither argument nor conflict is yet terminated. These are
struggles in progress...
(TRVME:215. My emphasis)
12 See MacIntyre's list of traditions that he has not yet dealt with in WJWR: 10-11.
13 See After Virtue, chapter 9.
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4Nietzsche or Aristotle? - An Ultimatum
MacIntyre is an advocate of the idea that to truly understand a
tradition/paradigm/scheme, one must be initiated into it at root level. It is
only in retrospect that one sees the sense in a scheme. So it is with
understanding the nature of God and the nature of the Bible and so it is with
understanding ethical traditions. The previous three chapters represent our
critical initiation into the coherence of MacIntyre's re-appropriating of an
ancient moral scheme. The findings in those chapters show, by and large,
that an ancient moral scheme can be re-appropriated if MacIntyre more fully
spellsout the implications of Gadamer'simplicit insistenceon our situatedness
in and indebtednessto the "Enlightenment Project".
The third chapter ends with us becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the
way in which MacIntyre demands that we reject the Enlightenment Project,
yet appropriates from it. We are also dissatisfied with the way in which we
must simply return to Aquinas, although the only reason to do so is that it is
betterthan Encyclopedicand Genealogicalschemesso far.
To more eloquently formulate our dissatisfaction with MacIntyre's
'doublespeak' we must return to the novel-thesiswhere MacIntyre's project to
reclaim the tradition of virtue ethics in the Aristotelian-Thomist sense, After
Virtue, begins. It is in looking at After Virtue in retrospect that MacIntyre's
project should be evaluated.
To recap, in After Virtue,MacIntyre tells us that:
Either one must follow through the aspirations of the Enlightenment
Project until there remains only the Nietzschean diagnosis and the
Nietzschean problematic or one must hold that the Enlightenment
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Project was not only mistaken but should never have been commenced
in the first place. There is no third alternative[ ...]
(AV: 111)
MacIntyre gives us the ultimatum: 'choose between Nietzscheand Aristotle-
there is no third alternative'. To this I ask the second part of my twofold
question to MacIntyre. The question is whether the dichotomy of "Nietzsche
versus Aristotle" represents the only viable alternatives for us in our efforts to
continue the enterprise of moral theorising. This question can be split up into
a further two questions:
• Does MacIntyre's ultimatum allow Aristotle to be vindicated on its own
terms i.e. if we allow the ultimatum to be taken seriously?
• Is MacIntyre's ultimatum coherent?
In answering these questions, I draw on Richard Bernstein's excellent essay,
published in 1986, "Nietzsche or Aristotle? Reflectionson Alasdair MacIntyre's
After Virtué'.
Bernstein on MacIntyre
For Bernstein, MacIntyre's ultimatum represents the highest stakes possible in
moral theory,
For the alternative posed by MacIntyre is not one view of morality
versus another - it is, rather, morality versus no morality [my
emphasis].
(Bernstein, 1986: 118)
A better alternative to what Bernstein is saying is perhaps to say that it is not
that there will be no morality, but rather that we will be entirely the creators
of our own moral precepts and intuitions. This is, I propose, truer to the
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Nietzschean spirit. Why does Bernstein call "Nietzschean morality" "no
morality'? Presumably, he regards "Nietzschean morality" as a grave
degeneration in moral theory.
If taken seriously, who then wins the ultimatum, after After Virtue, Whose
Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry? It is
Nietzsche who seems to win. Why does Nietzsche win? MacIntyre's
ultimatum means that if Aristotle cannot be definitively vindicated', Nietzsche
wins by default. Yet at the end of Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry,
MacIntyre explicitly says that the debate is far from settled and that it will
always be a debate in progress. He speaks of 'the best reasons so far', of
'openness to refutation' and 'the possibility of surrendering to better
conceptual schemes in the future'. It makes little sense then to propose a
stark ultimatum, a la "Enlightenment Project", unless it can be backed up with
ultimate knowledge. And the last mentioned, we have seen, is a chimera for
MacIntyre.
Bernstein makes the point2 that the tradition of the virtues seems as muddled
as contemporary debates concerning morality. If even the most coherent
moral scheme thus far - the tradition of the virtues - is muddled, then surely
the Nietzschean diagnosis is right, or rather: surely the evidence points
towards Nietzsche rather than Aristotle?
For Bernstein, the inconclusiveness of MacIntyre's narrative on the tradition of
the virtues unwittingly presents an apology for the vindication of Nietzsche.
Although Bernstein's article is written soon after After Virtue, his point
remains the same. This point is later backed up by the findings of this thesis,
namely that it is unlikely that there will be consensus on the greatest
1 For the language of ultimatum is the language of the Enlightenment and it contains ideals of
ultimate truth. Surely Madntyre should avoid such language.
21986: 119
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rationality of the Aristotelian-Thomist moral theory. As such Nietzschewins
the ultimatum by default.
The second question I am posing is, "Is MacIntyre's ultimatum coherent?" To
this question I respond "no", or at least agree with Bernstein (1986: 135) that
it is "systematically misleading".
For Bernstein, MacIntyre's attack on the "Enlightenment Project" is part of the
present mood that might be called "the rage against the Enlightenment, or
Modernity". This rage can be found in thinkers with whom MacIntyre may
have little sympathy- Heldeqqer",Adorno and Horkheimer. For Bernstein,
[t]here is overkill in these totalizing critiques - to use a Hegelian turn
of phrase, there is also a "truth" in the Enlightenment project which
itself needs to be reclaimed and preserved... for we do a grave
injustice to the Enlightenment if we fail to appreciate the extent to
which it was a legitimate protest against hypocrisy and injustice, if we
fail to appreciate how it was acutely sensitive to the failures of moral
and political ideologies that systematically excluded whole groups of
human beings from participating in the "good life" while they
"legitimized" political beliefs that maskedvarious forms of domination.
(Bernstein, 1986: 135)
Bernstein's main point is not to defend the emancipatory intentions of the
enliqhtenrnent." Rather, it is to show how much MacIntyre appropriates from
the very project that he tells us "had to fail". An excellent example of this
appropriation is that MacIntyre accepts Kant's principle that we should treat
3 For a good idea of the extent of Heidegger's rage against the Enlightenment and Modernity,
as characterised by the "technological disclosure of being", gesteil, see ''The question
concerning Technology" (1978).
4 Barber (1988: 188) says, on the emancipatory nature of the Enlightenment, that:
After virtue is after Eden, but also after hierarchy, after slavery, after absolutism and
after ignorance.
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all people as an end and not as a means. Basedon this, MacIntyre rejects
Aristotle's account of the virtues that is based on the exclusion of those who
do not belong to a proper polis, barbarians, slaves, women or whatever.
Throughout After Virtutf, MacIntyre stressesthat any adequate conception of
the virtues and the "good life" cannot be based on the exclusion of any
human. While MacIntyre can argue that what he is doing is strengthening
the defects of the Aristotelian scheme (it is a living tradition after all), he does
not reckon with the principles and standards according to which he does this.
MacIntyre amends the tradition of the virtues according to principles that
were hammered out during the Enlightenment; he utilizes the very moral
precepts that were laboriously produced in the course of the Enlightenmtn as
the latter developed in response to the hold of prejudice, superstition and
repression so typical of the medieval society from which the Enlightenment
gradually emancipated itself (Bernstein, 1986: 136-138). This simply proves
that it is a much more complex businessto criticise a tradition than to simply,
as MacIntyre seems to suggest we do, dismiss is as something that "had to
fail". Professor MacIntyre is as much a product of the very same tradition he
dismissesas all of us, including Nietzsche; his evaluation of Aristotelian ethics
is fundamentally influenced by his Enlightenment, modernist identity.
This thesis provides subsequent proof for this criticism in chapter 2,
particularly in the section on Gadamer's preconditions for understanding.
What MacIntyre does not heed is Gadamer's insistence on the idea that we
always understand (at least initially) in terms of our own tradition - in our
case, in terms of the aftermath of the Enlightenment Project. Or perhaps to
put it better, MacIntyre does not fully acknowledge the implications of his
own insistence on the normative force of tradition. MacIntyre forgets that he
always already has one foot in the Enlightenment project. He can reject
Aristotle's views but only in terms of "his own" (Enlightenment) prejudices
concerning universal human rights. In Bernstein'swords:
5 See for example p. 149
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It makesno historical senseto suggest that the "Enlightenment project
was not only mistaken but that it should never have been commenced
in the first place" [AV: 111]. To make such a claim, to oppose simply
the failures of the "moderns" with the wisdom of the "ancients," is to
violate MacIntyre's own insistence that we cannot escape our
historicity, our social identities, nor the traditions which inform our lives
- including the tradition of the Enlightenment itself.
(Bernstein, 1986: 139-140)
MacIntyre indeed appropriates an immense amount from the Enlightenment
when advocating a return to the Aristotelian-Thomist moral tradition. His idea
that it is worthwhile to gain consensus on moral issues through rational
argumentation still represents ideals hammered out during the
Enlightenment. Sure, he correctly rejects the idealised notion of absolute,
impartial knowledge, but he still wants to restore rational order to moral
theory. Why is this? Why not let the NietzscheanUbermensch prevail? It is
because he is a "son of the Enlightenment" and his membership in this
community is something he can never ultimately shake off.
MacIntyre's works also leave us with a melange of moral theories. He does
not achieve in his later books the consensusand rationality in moral theory
that he claims can be achieved in After Virtue. MacIntyre increasingly
discovers as his research on moral theory continues that debate is
interminable. Perhapsthe time has come, therefore, to put it to him that his
ultimatum in After Virtue is at best overstated and at worst, downright
incoherent. The problem with this state of affairs is that it detracts from the
lesser claim that he makes in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, namely
that his Thomist moral theory is the most coherent and rational so far. While
he gives good evidence that leans towards this point, the incoherence of the
ultimatum detracts from the overall coherence of his thesis. For what is
needed to vindicate Thomism is to show the coherence of its defense against
other rival theories. In order to vindicate Thomism, MacIntyre is compelled to
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once again return to After Virtue and clear up his own 'modern muddle
concerning morality'.
On the other hand, MacIntyre has learnt from what Bernstein says in
concluding his 1986article on After Virtue:
The problem today is how we can live with the conflict and tension
between the "truth" implicit in the tradition of the virtues and the
"truth" of the Enlightenment. This is what MacIntyre's own narrative
reveals. This is our narrative quest - for no one knows, nor can know,
how this quest will turn out. This is the deepest problem with which
we must live after virtue.
Strikingly, this is very similar to the conclusion that MacIntyre comes up with
himself fourteen years later when writing Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquirywhen he says that the conflict between rival moral theories is not yet
terminated and that "these are struggles in progress' [my emphasis] (TRVME:
215).
On the idea of a third alternative to the ultimatum
At the end of MacIntyre's work on moral theorising we increasingly see how
the "struggles in progress" are not to be rationally decided between by a stark
ultimatum. They are struggles to be hammered out by a matrix of
participants from different traditions and modes of enquiry. There is
disagreement over how to characterise what is at issue, yet mere
participation in the writing of the history of these debates is to participate in
the debates themselves (TRVME:215).
My suggestion to MacIntyre is that there is always the possibility of a third
alternative to the ultimatum. This idea is spawned by Hans-GeorgGadamer's
preconditions for understanding, particularly one's situatedness in tradition
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and the dialogic nature of understanding. MacIntyre should give his cultural
heritage another look and more carefully consider the merits of the
Enlightenment Project. Its aftermath, after all, represents the base-
knowledge from which he interprets and understands the world and more
specifically, the ancient world of Aristotle and Aquinas. Why does MacIntyre
say "Nietzsche or Aristotle?" and not "Nietzscheor Kant and/or Hume?"
MacIntyre's ultimatum in After Virtue betrays what MacIntyre himself achieves
in Three Riva/ Versions of Mora/ Enquiry - a genuine "openness" to new ideas
and to the idea that 'there can be something new under the sun'. This is
what MacIntyre still has to reconcile in order to make his reclaiming of the
Aristotelian tradition in moral theory more coherent.
Three Riva/ Versions of Mora/ Enquiry ends with MacIntyre coming a full circle
- revisiting his earlier dismissalsof traditions rivaling that of the virtues. The
"failure" of his ultimatum in all the sensesof the word discussedonly adds to
the "conversation that we are". Its failure adds to the scope of future moral
theorising. And continue the project of moral theorising in 'the dark ages that
are already upon us' we must, says MacIntyre. The problem with Three Riva/
Versions of Mora/ Enquiry is that it lands us in an environment of radical
disagreement and a barrage of confusing claims all competing for our
allegiance. MacIntyre's "long" history of ethics only lands the reader headfirst
in (an even greater- in the sense of 'more comprehensive') "modern muddle
concerning morality".
What we are left with at the end of MacIntyre's contemporary work is the
question, "Does the 'Nietzscheor Aristotle?' ultimatum leave us with the only
option with which we can continue the enterprise of moral theorising?" This
thesis finds the ultimatum to be systematically misleading (at the very least)
and what remains is to propose a constructive third alternative to the
ultimatum. This third alternative must first of all articulate the conditions for
ethics.
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Imagine in this regard that MacIntyre enters into dialogue with contemporary
moral theorist, Peter Singer, in order to hammer out what ethics is. Perhaps
the dialogue goes as follows:
For Singer (1993: 4), moral theorising, and the ethics it produces, is not
subjective or relative. His account affords a central role to reason in ethical
decisions (1993: 8). His account is clearly at odds with the emotivism
espoused by Ayer. On these general points, MacIntyre is in full agreement
with him. Singer's view of ethics can be seen to develop in four steps:
1. Ethics is the attempt to give reasonsfor acting the way we do:
The notion of living according to ethical standards is tied up with the
notion of defending the way one is living, of giving a reason for it, of
justifying it.
(Singer, 1993: 10)
MacIntyre says that while this is true, ethics goes beyond giving reasons for
one's own way of living. For MacIntyre, rational enquiry into ethics should in
principle vindicate one way of living (i.e. the Aristotelian-Thomist way) over
the others. However, the findings of this thesis are that this last claim is
something that MacIntyre cannot coherently vindicate. MacIntyre does not
convince us that the "neutral observer" who has not given his allegiance to
any specific theoretical moral stance, who is torn between claims competing
for his allegiance, will be convinced of the superior rationality of the
Aristotelian-Thomist tradition thus far. FollOWingGadamer, there is no
"neutral observer" - all understanding is situated. Is this not a claim
resembling Enlightenment thinking - namely, that the rationality of the
Aristotelian-Thomist tradition is such that any rational person in their right
mind must simply be converted to it? It makes no sense to propose that
people have yet to make up their minds considering which ethical theory they
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should give their allegiance to. Such people can only choose a different
ethical theory by already holding a prior one. Holding a neutral position in a
moral and ethical "vacuum" contravenesthe preconditions for understanding.
Where Singer agrees with MacIntyre is that this step is only a necessary
beginning in saying what ethics is.
2. For Singer, the justification of one's way of living must be of a
certain kind. Namely, it cannot be in terms of self-interest, but
must be addressedto a larger audience:
Self-interested acts must be shown to be compatible with more
broadly based ethical principles if they are to be ethically
. defensible, for the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of
something bigger than the individual.
(Singer, 1993: 10)
On this point, MacIntyre wholeheartedly agrees with Singer. MacIntyre is
always at pains to show the social and cultural situatedness of ethics. For
MacIntyre, ethics only makes sense in terms of the individual's position in a
larger cultural scheme.
3. For Singer, ethics must be universal in some sense. This idea is
held to varying degrees by a melange of thinkers from the ancients
to Jurgen Haberrnas," What these thinkers agree on is that "an
ethical principle cannot be justified in relation to any partial or
sectional group. Ethics takes a universal point of view" (Singer,
1993: 11).
6 For a historical discussion of thinkers that believe that ethics is somehow universal in some
way or another see Singer (1993: 10-11).
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While Singer and MacIntyre agree on this general point, what they make of
the consequencesof it marks a decisive split in their proposal on what ethics
is. For Singer, the universality in ethics can be found in its utility:
4. The universal aspect of ethics, I suggest, does provide a
persuasive, although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly
utilitarian position.
(Singer, 1993: 12)
In contrast, for MacIntyre, the universality in moral theorising can only be
restored if one returns to a teleological scheme as contained in Aristotelian-
Thomist thinking. The problem with this is that MacIntyre cannot guarantee
that this step will restore consensusand intelligibility to moral theorising. At
the end of Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry he seems to agree with
Singer that he (MacIntyre) can at best provide a persuasive, although not
conclusive, reason for taking a broadly Aristotelian-Thomist position.
However the language that MacIntyre's ultimatum in After Virtue is couched
in presupposesthat MacIntyre is offering us a conclusive reason for taking a
broadly Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. Why does MacIntyre give us this
ultimatum when he gives us insufficient reason to take his version of moral
theorising over, for example, Singer's?
Where consensus between MacIntyre and Singer ends is the point at which
we have to decide what we are going to do with the idea that there is some
form of universality in moral theorising. If there is indeed universality in
moral theorising, then it seems reasonable for MacIntyre to attempt to re-
appropriate an ancient moral scheme. Where this re-appropriation goes
wrong (and this thesis shows this in detail) is that MacIntyre does not fully
appreciate or adequately spell out Gadamer's preconditions for
understanding. For a better re-appropriation of Aristotle, let us consider
Gadamer's work. Gadamer shows us how such a re-appropriation is to be
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done. For the discussion of Gadamer's appropriation of Aristotle's notion of
ethics, I draw on Warnke (1987: 91-9).
Gadamer's analysis of ethical understanding cannot be separated from
hermeneutic understanding (Warnke, 1987: 94). Ethical understanding is one
more instance of understanding in general. Gadamer hermeneutically
appropriates many of the details of ethics in general from Aristotle's
understanding of ethics.
When we understand, according to Gadamer, we initially accept the views of
a foreign tradition, anticipating its completeness. However, the views of this
tradition are not simply adopted, but change with historical circumstance.
The same holds true of ethics. To elucidate what he means by this, Gadamer
makesuse of Aristotle's criticism of Plato'saccount of ethical knowledge.
For Plato, ethical knowledge is knowledge of the Form of the Good. In
contrast, for Aristotle, ethical knowledge is an understanding of the good for
man in concrete practical situations. Actors, says Gadamer (1975: 279) must
see the concrete situation in the light of what is demanded of them in
general. The problem here is that actors don't know what is demanded of
them in general without acting in concrete situations. For Aristotle, one
becomesa noble man by doing noble deeds. It is in doing noble deeds that
our understanding of what it is to be noble is transformed. This is the
hermeneutic circle that constitutes understanding. Gadamer analyses
Aristotle's point by saying that ethical knowledge is more a matter of practical
knowledge (phronesis) than theoretical knowledge. In ethics, according to
Gadamer,we need to know "how" rather than know "that". How does ethical
knowledge differ from technical knowledge for Gadamer? Warnke (1987; 93-
94) makes three points in this regard:
1) Technical knowledge is less dependent on the concrete situation
than ethical knowledge. Plugging a tooth, for example, is always
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fundamentally the same exercise, while courage can involve a
willingness to die or a refusal to die, according to the situation.
The important point is that in the latter case one's ethical choice
affects the norm and paradigm in question. In this case, "it is not
just a matter of fulfilling the norm of courage as best one can but
rather of filling in what that norm actually means." (Warnke, 1987:
93).
2) Technical knowledge is calculating and involves using means to
achieve ends in the most efficient manner possible. While ethical
knowledge also concerns ends, these ends have no clear content.
The relationship between meansand ends in ethical knowledge is a
reciprocal one. SaysWarnke (1987: 94):
The relationship between means and ends, then, is a reciprocal one.
Ethical knowledge is a matter of weighing various options against a
normative framework that is itself clarified through the options one
chooses. For this reason it can never involve simply the application of
a formula but rather requires reflection.
3) Ethical knowledge involves applying general principles to different
concrete situations. This is the same as with technical knowledge
except that "ethical knowledge is not unaffected by its mode of
application, nor can the desired result be determined in advance of
the situation." (Warnke, 1987: 94).
Ethical knowledge for Gadamercan only be concretized in the application of a
general normative understanding to specific circumstances. The same holds
true for hermeneutic understanding in general. We must relate the text of
ethics to the situation in which we find ourselves if we are to understand at
all. By applying the same hermeneutic method to ethics as to textual
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understanding, game playing7 and the social sciences in general, Gadamer
gives us a more coherent understanding of ethics than does MacIntyre.
Where MacIntyre goes wrong is to not adequately separate the modes of
enquiry specific to moral theorising, ethics, scientific understanding,
epistemology etc. MacIntyre uses the epistemological terms of "victory",
"defeat", "either-or", "vindication" etc. to elucidate his moral theorising. He
would have done better to stick to the terminology appropriate to moral
theorising as Gadamerdoes. An example of MacIntyre's 'mixing' of modes of
enquiry and their appropriate methods of justification occurs in the conditions
that he gives under which a tradition of enquiry can be vindicated.
In WhoseJustice? WhichRationality? (358), MacIntyre says that the test for
truth is to summon as many objections (of the greatest strength possible) to
a truth claim. We can with good reason hold to be true those claims that
withstand this type of dialectical testing. The problem with this idea is that
MacIntyre seems to draw on Popper's theory of what constitutes a scientific
theory. According to Popper, a theory is only scientific if one stipulates the
conditions under which it can be falsified. MacIntyre's mistake is to
appropriate scientific method and to try and superimpose it on the social
sciences. When this appropriation is complete, MacIntyre has simultaneously
relativised epistemology - "truth is the best truth we have so far", whilst he
makes the epistemological claim in After Virtue - "choose between Aristotle
and Nietzsche, there is no third alternative (and while you are at it also
chooseAristotle!)".
MacIntyre needs to tone down his claims and make them appropriate to what
can coherently and legitimately be claimed by ethical theorising and the social
I
sciences in general. In After Virtue he ignores the plea that Gadamer's re-
appropriation of Aristotle makes:
7 For an exposition of game playing see Warnke (1987: 48-55).
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Virtuous people are not those who simply impose their knowledge on
others or dogmatically apply their own experiences to the situations of
others. They are rather those who want what is good for the other
person involved, not what might be good for themselves, and are
therefore open to differences in experience and situation.
(Warnke: 1987: 94. My emphasis.)
For MacIntyre to propose a dogmatic ultimatum that effectively shuts down
openness to new experience betrays the virtue of his moral theorising. For
we have already seen that, according to Gadamer's hermeneutic theory of
ethics, practical ethical deeds alter ethical theory. If we are to take his claim
in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, that an ethical theory is vindicated
to the extent that it can account for and overcome its own inconsistencies,
seriously, then the 'unvirtuous' ultimatum in After Virtue seriously detracts
from the overall coherenceof his project.
MacIntyre's ultimatum also misunderstands the extent to which he is already
influenced by his agenda of wanting to reclaim the past. MacIntyre is a
thinker who has always langoured after antiquity and his attempt to reclaim
the Aristotelian-Thomist moral tradition can be seen as giving reasons for his
sentiments and intuitions. We have seen that both ethical knowledge and
hermeneutic understanding involve application to varying situations and
concerns. Consider the hermeneutic example of whether Huckleberry Finn is
a racist book:
The question of whether Huckleberry Finn is a racist book only arises in a
contemporary setting. However, one cannot read the book in a vacuum -
reading the book and then applying its content to the question posed. The
question already conditions the contents of the book. (Warnke, 1987: 96).
For Gadamer, when we understand Huckleberry Finn in light of the posed
question, we can only understand it differently or as he puts it in Truth and
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Method, "We understand differently if we understand at all" (Gadamer, 1975:
264).
When this example is applied to MacIntyre's moral theorising, surely his love
of antiquity will prejudice and condition the way in which he views Aristotle
and Aquinas. MacIntyre would agree with this formulation. The problem is
that his ultimatum does not sufficiently take note of the prejudice involved in
moral theorising. To simultaneously propose that knowledge of moral theory
is prejudiced and ultimate (hence the "either-or" language) makes no sense.
MacIntyre disregards what he himself says about the partly parochial nature
of knowledge of moral theory. Where both MacIntyre and Gadamer agree
with Aristotle is that knowledge concerning moral theory begins with a proper
upbringing and the appropriation of a general normative framework. This is,
as we have seen, the birthplace of a third alternative to the ultimatum.
MacIntyre agrees with Gadamer on his next general step concerning
understanding. This is that a tradition of understanding presents normative
parameters for understanding. When we approach Shakespeare'swork for
example, we assume its literary excellence and importance (Warnke, 1987:
96). Similarly, MacIntyre assumes the excellence of Aristotle and Aquinas.
Yet MacIntyre ignores what Gadamer goes on to say about hermeneutic
understanding: that it both assumesthe truth of its object and modifies it As
we have seen from Bernstein, MacIntyre assumes the truth of Aristotle and
modifies it to include previously excluded slaves, women, scientific reason as
opposed to teleology etc. However, MacIntyre's ultimatum is to be
counterfactual to the "borrowing" between paradigms or to the mutual
modification of paradigms. It makes no historical and hermeneutic sense to
starkly oppose the wisdom of the ancients to the failings of contemporary
thinkers. MacIntyre appropriates from the very failed paradigm that the
purports to reject.
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Gadamer'shermeneutic understanding of ethics is a coherent third alternative
to MacIntyre's ultimatum. Gadamer keeps with the preconditions for
understanding when he appropriates Aristotle. Aristotelian ethics can indeed
be reappropriated but not by contrasting the tradition of the virtues with the
"Enlightenment Project". The future of moral theorising should involve the
continuation of the dialogue between Aristotle and us. Gadamer's re-
appropriation of Aristotle represents a viable angle to begin historical research
on moral theorising. SaysGadamer(1975: 252-3):
What fills our historical consciousnessis always a variety of voices in
which the past echoes... Modern historical research is itself not only
research but mediation of tradition. We do not see it only under the
law of progress or of secured results; in it, as well, we have historical
experiences, as it were, since each time in it a new voice is heard in
which the past echoes.
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5Conclusion
To recap, this thesis seeks to evaluate MacIntyre's claim that recourse to the
tradition of virtue ethics in the Aristotelian-Thomist sense is the only viable
intellectual option, given the alleged demise of the so-called "Enlightenment
Project". It raisesa twofold question:
First, is it coherent to argue that such a re-appropriation of an ancient moral
tradition is possible? Doessuch a claim duly reckon with the conditions under
which meaningful forms are understood and applied?
In chapter 2 we see that MacIntyre does not sufficiently appreciate and spell
out the preconditions for understanding, as stipulated by Hans-Georg
Gadamer. We also see that his conception of rationality falls prey to
relativism and thus weakens the coherence of his preconditions for rationally
choosing between competing paradigms. At times MacIntyre uses the
"ultimate" language of the enlightenment and at times rejects it. He
simultaneously relativises epistemology and what counts as progress and
makes epistemological claims. In chapter 3 we see that MacIntyre does not
give us sufficient reason to give our allegiance to specifically the Aristotelian-
Thomist moral tradition. He concedes that his findings on rival ethical
theories and rationalities are inconclusive and that they represent debates in
progress, yet he maintains that the Thomist tradition simply must be re-
appropriated.
The second question we are asking to MacIntyre is whether the dichotomy of
"Nietzsche versus Aristotle" represents the only viable alternatives in our
efforts to continue moral theorising.
In chapter 4 we see that, following Bernstein and Gadamer, the ultimatum
makes no historical and hermeneutic sense. In fact, if taken seriously, it
97
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
actually vindicates Nietzsche! The author proposes a third alternative to the
ultimatum. This is Gadamer's hermeneutic re-appropriation of Aristotle's
conception of ethics. It is a better way of continuing the project of moral
theorising than the way paved by Madntyre's ultimatum because it better
incorporates the preconditions for hermeneutic and ethical understanding.
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